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AFTER MONSANTO:
A DOCTRINE STILL AT WAR WITH ITSELF*
TERRY CALVANI** AND ANDREW G. BERG***
In this article, two enforcement officials at the Federal Trade Com-
mission reexamine resale price maintenance in light of the Supreme
Court's recent decision in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp.
Commissioner Calvani and Mr. Berg consider both antitrust law and
economic policy in their review of the history of resale price mainte-
nance; they point out the chronic inconsistencies to which this antitrust
regime has been subject, and identify these same inconsistencies at work
in Monsanto. The authors set forth three theses with respect to Mon-
santo: first, that the Court intimated a willingness to reconsider at some
future time the per se standard of illegality for resale price maintenance;
second, that the Court recognized the continuing vitality of the Colgate
doctrine, which had been seriously questioned in recent years; and, third,
that the Monsanto Court unsuccessfully attempted to delineate a work-
able evidentiary standard applicable to communications between sellers
and resellers when it is alleged that such communications constitute an
illegal contract, combination, or consiracy under section one of the
Sherman Act. The authors suggest that, taken together, these elements
in Monsanto display a doctrine at war with itself The authors conclude
by examining the possible implications of the Monsanto decision for the
future direction of the law of resale price maintenance.
Typically, antitrust issues do not generate widespread public inter-
est; there is, however, a considerable amount of such interest in resale
price maintenance,' as evidenced by numerous articles on the subject in
newspapers and periodicals of general circulation.2 This high level of
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1. "Resale price maintenance, or vertical price fixing, refers to agreements between persons at
different levels of the market structure establishing the resale price or price ranges of products or
services." ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS (SECOND) 56 (1984)
[hereinafter cited as DEVELOPMENTS].
2. See, e.g., "We Harm the Economy If We Artificially Restrict Mergers," U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REPORT, May 14, 1984, at 77 (interview with Assistant Attorney General (Antitrust Divi-
sion) J. Paul McGrath); Jenkins, Seller Beware: Do Manufacturers Have the Right to Set Prices for
Retailers-And, Ultimately, Consumers?, TWA AMBASSADOR, Feb. 1984, at 88; Pertschuk & Cor-
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general interest3 is perhaps explained by the fact that consumers may
perceive a correlation between the practice of resale price maintenance
and an undesirable market effect, that is, higher prices for certain goods
and services. Such a clearly perceptible cause and effect relationship is
not typical of behavior regulated by the antitrust laws. By pointing to
the palpable effects of resale price maintenance, discount stores often can
enlist their customers in letter-writing campaigns designed to step up en-
forcement of the existing prohibition. 4 But resale price maintenance does
not present as clear-cut an antitrust violation as these market effects seem
to suggest. The inconsistent case law5 and the extensive scholarly de-
bate6 on this subject indicate both the need for and the difficulty of arriv-
reia, Resale Price Maintenance-Why the Per Se Rule Should Be Enforced, 19 NAT. J. 1201 (1983);
Barmash, Retailers Debate "Off-Price" Threat, N.Y. Times, June 22, 1983, at DI, col. 4; Taylor,
Congress Objects as Administration Seeks Relaxing of "Vertical Price-Fixing" Ban, Wall St. J., May
16, 1983, at 12, col. 1; Kleinfield, Fair-Trade Laws Fall in State After State, But Impact Is Small,
Wall St. J., June 11, 1975, at 1, col. 6; Business Brief RPM-Four Years Later, THE ECONOMIST,
Mar. 29, 1969, at 56; Yeager & Stark, Fair Trade's Future Faces Court Test, NATION'S BUS., Mar,
1956, at 46; Retreat of Fair Traders, TIME MAG., Dec. 19, 1955, at 90; How to Raise Prices, TIME
MAG., Oct. 10, 1955, at 108; Wolff & Holthausen, The Control of Retail Prices Under the Fair Trade
Laws, DUN'S REv., July 1938, at 15.
3. Popular notoriety may have had the effect of exaggerating the significance of the practice.
One commentator has concluded that resale price maintenance was not prevalent even in the heyday
of fair trade. Fewer than one percent of manufacturers employed resale price maintenance in any
one year from 1951 to 1956. Herman, A Statistical Note on Fair Trade, 4 ANTITRUST BULL. 583,
583-84 (1959). The total volume of goods sold subject to resale price maintenance was estimated at
between four and ten percent of all retail sales. Id. at 586. Overstreet and Fisher conclude that
resale price maintenance was only pervasive in drug and sundry items, liquor, and electrical appli-
ances. Various market forces, such as trade-in sales (automobiles), "package" sales (stereo compo-
nents), and rapidly fluctuating input costs (food and groceries) made the use of resale price
maintenance impractical for many products. Overstreet & Fisher, Resale Price Maintenance and
Distributional Efficiency: Some Lessons from the Past 15-16 (May 1984) (draft manuscript; on file
with the authors). On the "fair trade" movement and resale price maintenance, see infra notes 39-53
and accompanying text.
This relatively insignificant but highly visible marketplace practice seems to give rise to an
inordinate amount of antitrust litigation, however. See infra notes 102 & 142 and accompanying
text. It is difficult not to conclude that popular conceptions about resale price maintenance have
influenced the application of a much narrower technical antitrust concept and thus contributed to
the prevalence of such litigation.
4. Several companies, such as K-Mart and Burlington Coat Factory, have from time to time
and at several locations made position papers and post cards available to encourage their customers
to protest to their representatives and senators about the lack of government enforcement efforts in
the resale price maintenance area.
5. See infra notes 12-38, 54-56 & 142-67 and accompanying text.
6. This article does not attempt to review the plethora of legal and economic literature exam-
ining the law of resale price maintenance and vertical restraints that has appeared over the years.
Instead, we list a selection of this literature for reference. The law journal commentary includes
Jacobson, On Terminating Price-Cutting Distributors in Response to Competitors' Complaints, 49
BROOKLYN L. REV. 677 (1983); Pitofsky, In Defense of Discounters: The No-Frills Case for a Per Se
Rule Against Vertical Price Fixing, 71 GEo. L.J. 1487 (1983); Baxter, Vertical Restraints and Resale
Price Maintenance: A "Rule of Reason" Approach, 14 ANTITRUST L. & EcON. REV. 13 (1982);
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ing at a usable, yet not oversimplistic, synthesis of this antitrust concept.
The Supreme Court has struggled with resale price maintenance-
especially the concerted activity requirement imposed under section one
of the Sherman Act-ever since its 1911 decision in Dr. Miles Medical
Co. v. John D. Park & Sons.7 This struggle is due in large measure to the
Court's extension of the concerted activity requirement beyond the hori-
Liebeler, Intraband "Cartels" Under GTE Sylvania, 30 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1982); Piraino, Distributor
Terminations Pursuant to Conspiracies Among a Supplier and Complaining Distributors: A Suggested
Antitrust Analysis, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 297 (1982); Pollock, Customer Restrictions and Refusals to
Deal in the New Age of Reason, 13 U. TOL. L. REV. 559 (1982); Meehan & Lamer, A Proposed Rule
of Reason for Vertical Restraints on Competition, 26 ANTITRUST BULL. 195 (1981); Posner, The
Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV.
6 (1981); White, Vertical Restraints in Antitrust Law: A Coherent Model, 26 ANTITRUST BULL. 327
(1981); Andersen, The Antitrust Consequences of Manufacturer-Suggested Retail Prices--The Case
for Presumptive Illegality, 54 WASH. L. REv. 763 (1979); Williamson, Assessing Vertical Market
Restrictions: Antitrust Ramifications of the Transaction Cost Approach, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 953
(1979); Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania Deci-
sion, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1977); Baker, Vertical Restraints in Times of Change: From White to
Schwinn to Where?, 44 ANTITRUST L.J. 537 (1975); Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court:
An Analysis of the Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75
COLUM. L. REV. 282 (1975); Bork, Resale Price Maintenance and Consumer Welfare, 77 YALE L. J.
950 (1968); Gould & Yamey, Professor Bork on Vertical Price Fixing: A Rejoinder, 77 YALE L.J. 936
(1968); Pitofsky & Dam, Is the Colgate Doctrine Dead?, 37 ANTITRUST L.J. 772 (1968); Bork, A
Reply to Professors Gould and Yamey, 76 YALE L. J. 731 (1967); Gould & Yamey, Professor Bork on
Vertical Price Fixing, 76 YALE L.J. 722 (1967); Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept:
Price Fixing and Market Division, Pt. I1, 75 YALE L.J. 373 (1966); Bork, The Rule of Reason and the
Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division, Pt. 1, 74 YALE L.J. 775 (1965); Bork, Control of
Sales, 7 ANTITRUST BULL. 225 (1962); Levi, The Parke, Davis-Colgate Doctrine: The Ban on Resale
Price Maintenance, 1960 Sup. CT. REV. 258; Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?,
3 J.L. & ECON. 86 (1960); Herman, Fair Trade: Origins, Purposes, and Competitive Effects, 27 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 621 (1959); Adams, Resale Price Maintenance: Fact and Fancy, 64 YALE L.J. 967
(1955); Fulda, Resale Price Maintenance, 21 U. CHI. L. REV. 175 (1954).
For studies undertaken from an economist's point of view, see, for example, Mathewson &
Winter, The Incentives for Resale Price Maintenance Under Imperfect Information, 21 EcoN. IN-
QUIRY 337 (1983); Barrett, Restrictive Distribution and the Assault of the "Free Riders," 7 J. CORP.
L. 467 (1982); Cady, Reasonable Rules and Rules of Reason: Vertical Restrictions on Distributors, 46
J. MARKETING 27 (1982); Holahan, A Theoretical Analysis of Resale Price Maintenance, 21 J. ECON.
THEORY 411 (1979); Shepard, The Economic Effects ofRepealing Fair Trade Laws, 12 J. CONSUMER
AFF. 220 (1978); Spence, Product Differentiation and Welfare, 66 AMER. ECON. REV. 407 (1976);
Pickering, The Abolition of Resale Price Maintenance in Great Britain, 261 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS
120 (1974); Gould & Preston, Resale Price Maintenance and Retail Outlets, 32 ECONOMICA 302
(1965); Preston, Restrictive Distribution Arrangements: Economic Analysis and Public Policy Stan-
dards, 30 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 506 (Summer 1965); Stem, Approaches to Achieving Retail Price
Stability, 7 Bus. HORIZONS 75 (1964); Hollander, Dealer Margins Under Resale Price Maintenance,
3 Q. REV. ECON. & Bus. 25 (No. 3 1963); Frankel, The Effects of Fair Trade: Fact and Fiction in the
Statistical Findings, 28 J. Bus. 182 (1955); Bowman, Resale Price Maintenance-A Monopoly Prob-
lem, 25 J. BUS. 141 (1952); Corey, Fair Trade Pricing: A Reappraisal, 30 HARV. BUS. REV. 47
(1952); Yamey, The Origins of Resale Price Maintenance: A Study of Three Branches of Retail
Trade, 62 ECON. J. 522 (1952); FTC, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ON RESALE
PRICE MAINTENANCE (1945).
7. 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
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zontal context, where competitors acting in concert usually have com-
mon economic interests, to the vertical context, where the economic
interests of the manufacturer and the vendor may conflict. Dr. Miles and
its progeny, especially the Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
Colgate & Co.,8 attempt to distinguish conduct that may be easily distin-
guishable in theory, but not in practice. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Ser-
vice Corp.9 is the Supreme Court's latest attempt to make coherent
distinctions that provide some practical guidance to businesses and their
counsel, to enforcement agencies such as the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) and the Justice Department, and to the courts.
Considerable attention had been focused on the pendency of Mon-
santo Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp. The planned appearance of the
United States as amicus curiae on behalf of the appellant,10 and the con-
gressional ire that resulted, highlighted the litigation.II In March, 1984,
the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Monsanto. The Court's opin-
ion provides an opportunity to review the law and the policy of resale
price maintenance, and-perhaps more importantly-to evaluate the
legal standard now governing private litigation and federal enforcement
in this area. In this article we will first review the historical development
of the law of resale price maintenance; second, consider its policy ramifi-
cations; third, discuss the Monsanto case; and then conclude by examin-
ing the future implications for resale price maintenance. One of the
central questions that invariably arises as a result of such analysis is
8. 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
9. 104 S. Ct. 1464 (1984).
10. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 104 S. Ct. 1464, 1466 (1984). See infra note 101.
11. The appearance by the United States as amicus curiae on behalf of appellants provoked
considerable criticism in Congress. As a result, an amendment, introduced by Senator Warren Rud-
man, 129 CONG. REC. S14,430 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1983), was included in an appropriations act.
Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations
Act, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-166, 97 Stat. 1071, 1102-03 (1983). The amendment prohibited the use of
the funds appropriated for the Department of Commerce and related agencies (including the FTC)
and the Department of Justice and related agencies for "any activity, the purpose of which is to
overturn or alter the per se prohibition on resale price maintenance in effect under Federal antitrust
laws. ... Id. Although the government's brief had been prepared and submitted prior to the
adoption of the resolution, Pub. L. No. 98-166 precluded then-Assistant Attorney General William
F. Baxter from addressing during oral argument before the Supreme Court the question of whether
resale price maintenance should be evaluated under a rule of reason. See 129 CONG. REc. S 14,430-
33 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1983) (remarks of Sens. Rudman, Weicker, Nunn and Kennedy). The Rud-
man provision has been interpreted narrowly to apply only to attempts to seek a reversal of the
holdings of Dr. Miles and its progeny. See Presidential Statement on the Signing of H.R. 3222 into
Law, 19 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1619 (Nov. 28, 1983); Letter from Senator Warren Rudman to
President Ronald Reagan (Nov. 29, 1983) (acknowledging the validity of President Reagan's inter-
pretation of the provision). Pub. Law No. 98-166 governed appropriations for federal fiscal year
ended September 30, 1984, and the succeeding legislation, Departments of Commerce, Justice, and
State, and Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1985, Pub. L. No. 98-411, 98 Stat.
1545 (1984), did not include a limitation similar to the Rudman provision.
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whether the current per se prohibition against resale price maintenance
should be discarded in favor of a rule of reason insofar as the latter al-
lows for a factually based approach that can accomodate the many forms
in which this antitrust issue arises.
I. THE HISTORY OF RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE
A. Dr. Miles and the "Demise" of the Colgate Doctrine.
Traditionally, most discussions of resale price maintenance begin
with the 1911 Supreme Court decision in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John
D. Park & Sons. 12 Dr. Miles Medical Company, a manufacturer of pro-
prietary medicine, brought an equitable action seeking to enjoin the de-
fendant wholesaler from obtaining a Dr. Miles product from authorized
distributors for the purpose of resale at "cut prices." Under its distribu-
tion plan, the plaintiff and its authorized distributors had entered into
contracts that established resale prices, and the case turned on the valid-
ity of those contracts. The Court proceeded to analyze the question by
asking whether the restraint upon alienation was valid. It concluded that
it was not. Acknowledging that restraints upon alienation are analyzed
under a rule of reason, the Court stated that "agreements or combina-
tions between dealers, having for their sole purpose the destruction of
competition and the fixing of prices, are injurious to the public interest
and void." 13
12. 220 U.S. 373 (1911). In Fowle v. Park, 131 U.S. 88 (1889), the first case involving resale
price maintenance reviewed by the Supreme Court, the Court held that a requirement imposed by a
manufacturer that his patent medicine not be sold below a stated minimum price was not unreasona-
ble or invalid as a restraint of trade. In so doing, the Court stated that the "vendors were entitled to
sell to the best advantage, and in so doing to exercise the right to preclude themselves from entering
into competition with those who purchased, and to prevent competition between purchasers; and the
purchasers were entitled to such protection as was reasonably necessary for their benefit." 131 U.S.
at 97 (emphasis added).
In a case decided by the Supreme Court in 1908, the right to maintain resale prices with refer-
ence to copyrighted goods was denied. See Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 350 (1908);
see also Scribner v. Straus, 210 U.S. 352, 354 (1908) (decided on jurisdictional grounds). The previ-
ous year, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in J.D. Park & Sons v. Hartman, 153 F. 24, 35
(6th Cir. 1907), had held that resale price maintenance was illegal under both the common law and
the Sherman Act in the absence of evidence demonstrating the need for such a pricing policy. See T.
OVERSTREET, RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE: ECONOMIC THEORIES AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 3
n.1 (1984); see also E. SELIGMAN & R. LovE, PRICE CUTTING AND PRICE MAINTENANCE (1932).
Other early cases in this area include Straus v. Victor Talking Mach. Co., 243 U.S. 490 (1917) (the
monopoly granted under the patent law cannot be used to control prices of patented articles after
they have effectively been paid for), and Bauer & Cie v. O'Donnell, 229 U.S. 1 (1913) (a patentee
may not limit the price at which future retail sales of the patented article can be made).
13. 220 U.S. at 408. The Court specifically rejected Dr. Miles's contention that minimal resale
prices were needed to prevent erosion of its dealer organization as a result of price cutting. Id. at
407. Justice Holmes, in dissent, was concerned with the interbrand effects of the resale price prohibi-
tion: "I cannot believe that in the long run the public will profit by. . . permitting [retailers] to cut
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The Court's opinion in Dr. Miles rests upon its conclusion that the
restraint upon alienation in question was unreasonable under common
law principles.14 Antitrust policy played a very minor role in the Court's
decision.' 5 Indeed, the brief mention of the Sherman Act in the opinion
is dictum. Thus, the antitrust significance of the Dr. Miles decision has
been greatly overestimated by subsequent courts and commentators.1 6
Supreme Court decisions following Dr. Miles have attempted to de-
termine what type of conduct satisfies the concerted action requirement
under the Sherman Act. These decisions, starting with the Colgate case,
often rest on conduct that has economically ambiguous consequences
and make distinctions that provide little practical guidance for future
cases.
The Supreme Court appeared to carve out an exception to the Dr.
Miles "rule" in United States v. Colgate & Co., 7 in which the Court
addressed the lawfulness of Colgate's unilateral refusal to sell to distribu-
tors that did not honor resale prices set by Colgate. The government did
not allege, nor did it introduce evidence to establish, that there were
reasonable prices for some ulterior purpose of their own and thus to impair, if not to destroy, the
production and sale of articles which . . . the public should be able to get." Id. at 412.
14. The Court stated:
With respect to contracts in restraint of trade, the earlier doctrine of the common law
has been substantially modified in adaptation to modem conditions. But the public interest
is still the first consideration. To sustain the restraint, it must be found to be reasonable
both with respect to the public and to the parties and that it is limited to what is fairly
necessary, in the circumstances of the particular case, for the protection of the covenantee.
Otherwise restraints of trade are void as against public policy.
The complainant's plan falls within the principle which condemns contracts of this
class. It, in effect, creates a combination for the prohibited purposes. No distinction can
properly be made by reason of the particular character of the commodity in question. It is
not entitled to special privilege or immunity. It is an article of commerce and the rules
concerning the freedom of trade must be held to apply to it. Nor does the fact that the
margin of freedom is reduced by the control of production make the protection of what
remains, in such a case, a negligible matter. And where commodities have passed into the
channels of trade and are owned by dealers, the validity of agreements to prevent competi-
tion and to maintain prices is not to be determined by the circumstance whether they were
produced by several manufacturers or by one, or whether they were previously owned by
one or by many. The complainant having sold its product at prices satisfactory to itself,
the public is entitled to whatever advantage may be derived from competition in the subse-
quent traffic.
Id. at 406, 408-09. The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice has interpreted Dr. Miles
similarly. See [Current Comment-1969-1983] TRADE REG. RE. (CCH) 50,442, at 56,010 (cor-
respondence from then-Assistant Attorney General William F. Baxter to Representative Robert Mc-
Clory dated June 18, 1982, setting forth the Antitrust Division's views on resale price maintenance)
[hereinafter cited as Baxter Letter].
15. The Court made only two references to the Sherman Act, and in both instances there was
also a reference to common law theories of liability. See Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 400, 409.
16. Citations for the proposition that Dr. Miles holds that minimum resale price maintenance is
per se illegal are legion. See, e.g., Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 386
(1951); Yentsch v. Texaco, Inc., 630 F.2d 46, 51 (2d Cir. 1980); infra note 106.
17. 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
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agreements obligating distributors to maintain the minimum prices set by
Colgate. The Court dismissed the indictment, finding that no violation
of section one of the Sherman Act was charged absent any allegation of
illegal agreement:
In the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly, the
[A]ct does not restrict the long recognized right of trader or manufac-
turer engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own
independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal. And, of
course, he may announce in advance the circumstances under which
he will refuse to sell. 18
Mr. Justice McReynolds distinguished the Court's decision in Dr. Miles
on the ground that "[i]n Dr. Miles . . .the unlawful combination was
effected through contracts which undertook to prevent dealers from freely
exercising the right to sell."19 The fact that the Colgate decision rested
heavily on procedural aspects of the case-the government's failure to
allege the existence of illegal agreements-made the Court's attempted
distinction between unilateral action and concerted conduct of uncertain
precedential value.
The distinction between unilateral and concerted activity, upon
which the Court relied in Colgate, began to erode the following year in
United States v. A. Schrader's Son, Inc.,20 when the Court attempted for
the first time to define the element of "agreement" in the context of a
resale price maintenance case. Schrader's involved the criminal prosecu-
tion under section one of a tire valve and gauge manufacturer for enter-
ing into a series of price-fixing agreements with the jobbers and
manufacturers that purchased its products. The trial court dismissed the
indictment, 2' but the Supreme Court reversed. Mr. Justice McReynolds,
18. Id. at 307.
19. Id. at 307-08 (emphasis added).
20. 252 U.S. 85 (1920).
21. In so doing, the trial judge stated:
Personally, and with all due respect, permit me to say that I can see no real difference upon
the facts between the Dr. Miles Medical Co. Case and the Colgate Co. Case. The only
difference is that in the former the arrangement for marketing its product was put in writ-
ing, whereas in the latter the wholesale and retail dealers observed the prices fixed by the
vendor. This is a distinction without a difference. The tacit acquiescence of the wholesal-
ers and retailers in the prices thus fixed is the equivalent for all practical purposes of an
express agreement. ...
...Granting the fundamental proposition stated in the Colgate Case, that the manu-
facturer has an undoubted right to specify resale prices and refuse to deal with any one who
fails to maintain the same, or, as further stated, the [A]ct does not restrict the long-recog-
nized right of a trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business freely to
exercise his own independent discretion as to the parties with whom he will deal, and that
he of course may announce in advance the circumstances under which he will refuse to sell,
it seems to me that it is a distinction without a difference to say that he may do so by the
subterfuges and devices set forth in the opinion and not violate the Sherman Anti-Trust
Act, yet if he had done the same thing in the form of a written agreement, adequate only to
effectuate the same purpose, he would be guilty of a violation of the law. Manifestly, there-
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writing for the majority, attempted to harmonize Dr. Miles and Colgate
by emphasizing that, as in the case of horizontal restraints, an agreement
can be inferred from a course of dealing:
The court below misapprehended the meaning and effect of the
opinion and judgment in [Colgate]. We had no intention to overrule or
modify the doctrine of Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co.,
where the effort was to destroy the dealers' independent discretion
through restrictive agreements. Under the interpretation adopted by
the trial court and necessarily accepted by us, the indictment failed to
charge that Colgate & Company made agreements, either express or
implied, which undertook to obligate vendees to observe specified re-
sale prices; and it was treated "as alleging only recognition of the man-
ufacturer's undoubted right to specify resale prices and refuse to deal
with anyone who failed to maintain the same."
It seems unnecessary to dwell upon the obvious difference be-
tween the situation presented when a manufacturer merely indicates
his wishes concerning prices and declines further dealings with all who
fail to observe them, and one where he enters into agreements-
whether express or implied from a course of dealing or other circum-
stances-with all customers throughout the different States which un-
dertake to bind them to observe fixed resale prices. In the first, the
manufacturer but exercises his independent discretion concerning his
customers and there is no contract or combination which imposes any
limitation on the purchaser. In the second, the parties are combined
through agreements designed to take away dealers' control of their
own affairs and thereby destroy competition and restrain the free and
natural flow of trade amongst the States.22
The Court relied heavily upon its decision in Schrader's to affirm,
one year later, the trial court's finding of treble damage liability in Frey &
Son v. Cudahy Packing Co. 23 Frey alleged that Cudahy, the manufac-
turer of "Old Dutch Cleanser," conspired with jobbers to maintain resale
prices in violation of section one. The Fourth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals-which reviewed the case after the Supreme Court's decision in
Colgate but before its decision in Schrader's-reversed a jury verdict on
the authority of the Supreme Court's decision in Colgate, concluding that
"[t]here was no formal written or oral agreement with jobbers for the
maintenance of prices."'24 In reversing the court of appeals' decision, Mr.
Justice McReynolds wrote for the Supreme Court:
fore, the decision in the Dr. Miles Medical Case must rest upon some other ground than
the mere fact that there were agreements between the manufacturer and the wholesalers.
United States v. A. Schrader's Son, Inc., 264 F. 175, 183-84 (N.D. Ohio 1919), rev'd, 252 U.S. 85
(1920).
22. 252 U.S. at 99-100 (emphasis added); see also United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S.
29, 38-39 (1960).
23. 256 U.S. 208 (1921).




It is unnecessary to repeat what we said in United States v. Colgate &
Co. and United States v. A. Schrader's Son, Inc. Apparently the former
case was misapprehended. The latter opinion distinctly stated that the
essential agreement, combination or conspiracy might be implied from
a course of dealing or other circumstances. Having regard to the
course of dealing and all the pertinent facts disclosed by the present
record, we think whether there existed an unlawful combination or
agreement between the manufacturer and jobbers was a question for
the jury to decide, and that the Circuit Court of Appeals erred when it
held otherwise.25
The Supreme Court attempted to delineate further the distinction
between the Dr. Miles and Colgate decisions in FTC v. Beech-Nut Pack-
ing Co.26 Beech-Nut had adopted an elaborate system to maintain the
resale prices of its food products. The company refused to sell its prod-
ucts to wholesalers or retailers that did not adhere to an announced
schedule of resale prices; refused to sell to wholesalers that sold to retail-
ers that discounted; reinstated a discounter after it gave Beech-Nut ade-
quate assurances that it would adhere to the resale price policy; and
implemented a detailed scheme that utilized code numbers on its prod-
ucts and reporting by cooperating wholesalers and retailers to detect vio-
lations of its resale policies. The FTC held that the so-called "Beech-Nut
Plan" constituted an unfair method of competition within the meaning of
section five of the Federal Trade Commission Act.27 The Second Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed this determination on the basis of Colgate.28
After reviewing the Court's decisions in Dr. Miles, Colgate, Schrader's,
and Cudahy Packing, Mr. Justice Day wrote for the Court:
By these decisions it is settled that in prosecutions under the Sher-
man Act a trader is not guilty of violating its terms who simply refuses
to sell to others, and he may withhold his goods from those who will
not sell them at the prices which he fixes for their resale. He may not,
consistently with the [A]ct, go beyond the exercise of this right, and by
contracts or combinations, express or implied, unduly hinder or ob-
struct the free and natural flow of commerce in the channels of inter-
state trade.
• . . The facts found show that the Beech-Nut system goes far
beyond the simple refusal to sell goods to persons who will not sell at
stated prices, which in the Colgate Case was held to be within the legal
right of the producer.
25. 256 U.S. at 210.
26. 257 U.S. 441 (1922).
27. FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 1 F.T.C. 516, 528 (1919), rev'd, 264 F.885 (2d Cir. 1920),
rev'd, 257 U.S. 441 (1922).
28. Beech-Nut Packing Co. v. FTC, 264 F. 885 (2d Cir. 1920), rev'd, 257 U.S. 441 (1922).
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• ..The specific facts found show suppression of the freedom of
competition by methods in which the company secures the cooperation
of its distributors and customers which are quite as effectual as agree-
ments express or implied intended to accomplish the same purpose. By
these methods the company, although selling its products at prices sat-
isfactory to it, is enabled to prevent competition in their subsequent
disposition by preventing all who do not sell at resale prices fixed by it
from obtaining its goods. 29
Accordingly, the Court reversed the court of appeals' reversal of the
FTC's decision.
The Court's narrow reading of the Colgate decision in Beech-Nut
was underscored in United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co.,30 in
which the Court focused on whether Bausch & Lomb and Soft-Lite, the
sole purchaser of its pink-tinted lenses, had entered into illicit contracts,
express or implied, to maintain the resale price of the lenses. Soft-Lite
sought to control the retail price charged for the lenses through such
means as granting retailer licenses only if retailers bought lenses from
"licensed" Soft-Lite distributors and resold them at prevailing local
prices; allowing its wholesalers to sell only to licensed retailers; and indi-
cating to its licensed wholesalers by means of published price lists the
prices to be received by them from licensed retailers. It enforced compli-
ance with the license requirements through the use of a "Protection Cer-
tificate" that allowed the wholesale source of Soft-Lite lenses found in the
hands of unlicensed retailers to be traced; through surveillance by Soft-
Lite's salesmen; through exclusion from Soft-Lite's list of designated
wholesalers if a wholesaler did business with unapproved retailers; and
through cancellation of a retailer's license if the terms of the license were
violated. The trial court found that Soft-Lite had conspired with its
wholesalers and retailers in violation of section one.31 Appellants, pre-
dictably, argued that on the basis of Colgate the trial court's finding of a
conspiracy was in error. The Court rejected this argument, noting that
Colgate did not involve, "as the present case does, an agreement between
the seller and purchaser to maintain resale prices."'32 The Supreme
Court also rejected appellants' reliance on Beech-Nut, recognizing that
29. 257 U.S. at 452-55; see also United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 42 (1960)
("However, because Beech-Nut's methods were as effective as agreements in producing the result
that 'all who would deal in the company's products are constrained to sell at the suggested prices,'
257 U.S. at 455, the Court held that the securing of the customers' adherence by such methods
constituted the creation of an unlawful combination to suppress price competition among the
retailers.").
30. 321 U.S. 707 (1944).
31. 45 F. Supp. 387, 397 (S.D.N.Y. 1942), affd, 321 U.S. 707 (1944).
32. 321 U.S. at 721.
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although Beech-Nut held that a simple refusal to sell to those who do not
maintain the seller's resale prices was legal,
"[the seller] may not, consistently with the [A]ct, go beyond the
exercise of this right, and by contracts or combinations, express or im-
plied, unduly hinder or obstruct the free and natural flow of commerce
in the channels of interstate trade."...
As in the Beech-Nut case, there is more here than mere acquies-
cence of wholesalers in Soft-Lite's published resale price list. The
wholesalers accepted Soft-Lite's proffer of a plan of distribution by co-
operating in prices, limitation of sales to and approval of retail licen-
sees. That is sufficient ...
• . . Whether this conspiracy and combination was achieved by
agreement or by acquiescence of the wholesalers coupled with assist-
ance in effectuating its purpose is immaterial. 33
The Court's opinion in United States v. Parke, Davis & Co34 also
reflects its narrowing of the Colgate doctrine. Parke Davis, a national
drug manufacturer with a longstanding policy of resale price mainte-
nance, had announced that it would refuse to sell to any wholesaler who
supplied price-cutting retailers, and, more specifically, to five wholesal-
ers, each of which knew that the others had been warned and had agreed
to comply with Parke Davis's resale policy. In a further effort to imple-
ment this policy, Parke Davis assured retailers that their competitors
would maintain prices if they would do likewise and permitted retailers
who previously had been excluded to resume purchases of its products in
return for promises by these retailers not to engage in future price-cut-
ting. Although Parke Davis claimed to have exercised considerable effort
to stay within the parameters of the Colgate doctrine, the Supreme
Court, after engaging in an extensive review of Dr. Miles and subsequent
decisions, found that Parke Davis's program to promote compliance with
its suggested resale prices "plainly exceeded the limitations of the Colgate
doctrine":
Parke Davis did not content itself with announcing its policy regarding
retail prices and following this with a simple refusal to have business
relations with any retailers who disregarded that policy. Instead Parke
Davis used the refusal to deal with the wholesalers in order to elicit
their willingness to deny Parke Davis products to retailers and thereby
help gain the retailers' adherence to its suggested minimum retail
prices. In thus involving the wholesalers to stop the flow of Parke Da-
33. Id. at 722-23 (quoting Beech-Nut, 257 U.S. at 453); see also United States v. Parke, Davis &
Co., 362 U.S. 29, 43 (1960) (noting that, after Beech-Nut, the Colgate doctrine meant "no more than
that a single refusal to sell to customers who will not resell at prices suggested by the seller is
permissible under the Sherman Act").
34. 362 U.S. 29 (1960). See generally Levi, The Parke, Davis-Colgate Doctrine: The Ban on
Resale Price Maintenance, 1960 Sup. Cr. REv. 258, 324 n.315 (quoting a Justice Department offi-
cial's remark that Parke, Davis sounded the "death knell" for resale price maintenance).
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vis products to the retailers, thereby inducing retailers' adherence to its
suggested retail prices, Parke Davis created a combination with the
retailers and the wholesalers to maintain retail prices and violated the
Sherman Act. Although Parke Davis' originally announced wholesal-
ers' policy would not under Colgate have violated the Sherman Act if
its action thereunder was the simple refusal without more to deal with
wholesalers who did not observe the wholesalers' [resale price sched-
ule,] that entire policy was tainted with the "vice of illegality,"...
when Parke Davis used it as the vehicle to gain the wholesalers' partic-
ipation in the program to effectuate the retailers' adherence to the sug-
gested retail prices. 35
Moreover, the Court found that by obtaining assurances of compliance
from the retailers, Parke Davis effected the illicit combination:
[I]f a manufacturer is unwilling to rely on individual self-interest to
bring about general voluntary acquiescence which has the collateral
effect of eliminating price competition, and takes affirmative action to
achieve uniform adherence by inducing each customer to adhere to
avoid such price competition, the customers' acquiescence is not then a
matter of individual free choice prompted alone by the desirability of
the product. The product then comes packaged in a competition-free
wrapping-a valuable feature in itself-by virtue of concerted action
induced by the manufacturer. The manufacturer is thus the organizer
of a price-maintenance combination or conspiracy in violation of the
Sherman Act.
36
Summarizing the line of cases beginning with Colgate, the Parke, Davis
Court held that
[w]hen the manufacturer's actions, as here, go beyond mere announce-
ment of his policy and the simple refusal to deal, and he employs other
means which effect adherence to his resale prices, [the] countervailing
consideration [found in Colgate] is not present and therefore he has
put together a combination in violation of the Sherman Act. Thus,
whether an unlawful combination or conspiracy is proved is to be
judged by what the parties actually did rather than by the words they
used.37
In a potent dissent, Mr. Justice Harlan, along with Justices Frankfurter
and Whitaker, argued that the majority had misread Beech-Nut and
Bausch & Lomb and concluded that "[s]crutiny of the opinion [in Parke,
Davis] will reveal that the Court has done no less than send to its demise
the Colgate doctrine which has been a basic part of antitrust law concepts
since it was first announced in 1919."38
35. 362 U.S. at 4546.
36. Id. at 46-47.
37. Id. at 44.
38. Id. at 49 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also George W. Warner & Co. v. Black & Decker Mfg.
Co., 277 F.2d 787, 788-90 (2d Cir. 1960).
Given Dr. Miles and its progeny, one might wonder just what type of resale-price-related con-
duct is permissible under section one of the Sherman Act. Under Colgate, a manufacturer may
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B. The Rise and Fall of the Fair Trade Laws.
The organization of the American Fair Trade League in 1913-two
years after the Supreme Court's decision in Dr. Miles-initiated the
movement to legalize resale price maintenance contracts. It was not un-
til 1931, however, that California became the first state to enact fair trade
legislation.39 By 1950, forty-five states had passed fair trade legislation.4°
Although bills to permit fair trade were introduced in each session
of the Congress after 1914,41 it was not until 1937 that Congress enacted
suggest list or resale prices to dealers and, provided that dealers have an actual right to decide
independently whether to observe them, no antitrust violation will ensue. See, e.g., Klein v. Ameri-
can Luggage Works, 323 F.2d 787, 790-91 (3d Cir. 1963); Denison Mattress Factory v. Spring-Air
Co., 308 F.2d 403, 406 n.3, 411-12, 411 n.6 (5th Cir. 1962). Resale prices may be suggested by
means of suggested price lists, see, e.g., Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505, 510 (2d Cir. 1964), cert.
dismissed, 381 U.S. 125 (1965); United States v. O.M. Scott & Sons, 303 F. Supp. 141, 148, 153-55
(D.D.C. 1969), by price advertising, see, e.g., Engbrecht v. Dairy Queen Co., 203 F. Supp. 714, 719
(D. Kan. 1962), and by price preticketing, see, e.g., Klein v. American Luggage Works, 323 F.2d
787, 790-91 (3d Cir. 1963); Bailey's Bakery v. Continental Baking Co., 235 F. Supp. 705, 721-22 (D.
Hawaii 1964); see also Impact of the Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975 on FTC's Position on
Manufacturer Preticketing, 88 F.T.C. 1016 (1976) (advisory opinion requested by the National
Outerwear & Sportswear Association). However, use of coercive tactics that interfere with in-
dependent pricing decisions by dealers may result in a finding of a violation of section one. Although
"exposition, persuasion or argument," see DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 1, at 61, in an attempt to
produce compliance with suggested prices is permissible, threats of sanctions for noncompliance, see,
e.g., Arnott v. American Oil Co., 609 F.2d 873, 885 (8th Cir. 1979); Lehrman v. Gulf Oil Corp., 464
F.2d 26, 32-33 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1077 (1972), or the use of sanctions, see, e.g., Greene
v. General Foods Corp., 517 F.2d 635, 644 n.5, 658 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 942
(1976), or tactics such as enlisting customer aid in policing, see, e.g., United States v. General Motors
Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 136-37, 142-43 (1966); Interphoto Corp. v. Minolta Corp., 295 F. Supp. 711,
716, 719 n.3 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd per curiam, 417 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1969), are all violations of section
one. Certain other conduct, such as requiring approval for deviations from list prices, responding
with retaliatory wholesale price increases, placing dealers on probation, or using short-term leases
and contracts, will likewise constitute a violation, see DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 1, at 61-62. The
FTC has taken the position that denial of cooperative advertising reimbursement to dealers for ad-
vertisements that do not conform to the manufacturer's suggested resale price constitutes unlawful
vertical price fixing. See Statement of Policy Regarding Price Restrictions in Cooperative Advertis-
ing Programs, [Current Comment-1979-1984] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 39,057 (Oct. 26, 1981);
In re Totes, Inc., 96 F.T.C. 335, 338 (1980). But see In re Nissan Antitrust Litigation, 577 F.2d 910,
914-17 (5th Cir. 1978) (not a per se violation of the Sherman Act). Because of the numerous restric-
tions imposed by decisions such as these on a manufacturer's right to terminate noncomplying ven-
dors, it is generally acknowledged that Colgate has very limited utility as a guide to the
implementation of a legal program of resale price maintenance. See ANTITRUST ADVISER § 2.31, at
132 (C. Hills ed. 2d ed. 1978); cf infra notes 109-19 and accompanying text.
39. 1931 Cal. Stat. ch. 278 (repealed by 1975 Cal. Stat. chs. 402, 429). See also T. OVER-
STREET, supra note 12, at 4.
40. See A. McLaughlin, An Economic Analysis of Resale Price Maintenance 7 (1979) (unpub-
lished doctoral dissertation submitted to the Economics Department, UCLA; on file with the au-
thors) [hereinafter cited as McLaughlin Dissertation]; see also T. OVERSTREET, supra note 12, at 4.
41. See McLaughlin Dissertation, supra note 40, at 1, 6.
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the Miller-Tydings Amendment 42 to the Sherman Act.43 One might
question how the states could exempt resale price maintenance from the
ambit of the Sherman Act after Dr. Miles and before the Miller-Tydings
Amendment. There are two possible explanations. First, because the Dr.
Miles decision rested on the common law of restraints on alienation,
states could properly change that common law by statute. This explana-
tion obviously assumes that the Sherman Act discussion in Dr. Miles was
nothing more than dictum.44 Second, whereas the jurisdiction of the
Sherman Act is now held to be coextensive with the commerce powers
under the Constitution, 45 the scope of those powers prior to the mid-
twentieth century were thought to be much more circumscribed. 46 Thus,
it may have been thought that states could properly exempt intrastate
sales without posing a direct challenge to the supremacy clause of the
Constitution.47
Many vendors enforced their price maintenance distribution policies
against resalers with which they had no resale price maintenance agree-
ments. These vendors argued that a contract containing a "nonsigner"
clause valid under state law, when executed with one of their customers,
would also cover customers with whom they had no such contracts.
Thus, a contract with one reseller would bind all resellers.48  The
Supreme Court rejected this argument in Schwegmann Brothers v. Cal-
vert Distillers Corp. in 1951. 49 The Court held that nonsigners were not
42. District of Columbia Revenue Act of 1937, ch. 690, tit. VIII, 50 Stat. 673, 693 (repealed by
the Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-145, 89 Stat. 801). Professor Howard
Marvel has observed that the Amendment was passed within a year of the Robinson-Patman Act,
Pub. L. No. 74-692, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936). See generally Marvel, How Fair is Fair Trade? (1984)
(unpublished manuscript; on file with the authors). Query, then, whether the National Association of
Retail Druggists, which was instrumental in the adoption of both laws, saw the objectives of both to
be related. Overstreet conjectures that both laws were enacted to protect high-cost distributors from
price-cutting competition. See T. OVERSTREET, supra note 12, at 5.
43. Proponents of the legislation were required to attach the Act to a District of Columbia
revenue bill in order to escape a presidential veto. See McLaughlin Dissertation, supra note 40, at 1.
44. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
45. See United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944); see also I P.
AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 232a, at 228 (1978).
46. See, e.g., United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895); see generally Eckinger, Con-
flicting Interpretations of the Sherman Act's Jurisdictional Requirement, 32 VAND. L. REV. 1215
(1979).
47. U.S. CONT. art. VI, cl. 2.
48. Early state fair trade statutes, such as California's 1931 provision, 1931 Cal. Stat. ch. 278,
were largely ineffective because vendors who had not signed contracts with fair trade manufacturers
nonetheless obtained the latter's products and resold them at prices below the fair trade price. Man-
ufacturers attempted to prevent this by including a nonsigner clause, which bound all subsequent
vendors to maintain a minimum resale price so long as at least one vendor in the chain of distribu-
tion had signed a contract agreeing to do so. See McLaughlin Dissertation, supra note 40, at 7.
49. 341 U.S. 384 (1951). Maryland and Delaware distributors of liquor sought to enjoin a
Louisiana retailer, who was not a party to the fair trade contract, from selling below the established
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bound under principal contracts. Thus, enforcement of resale price
maintenance against nonsigners was not only unauthorized, but also ille-
gal. In response to the Schwegmann decision, Congress in 1952 enacted
the McGuire Amendment to the Federal Trade Commission Act, which
permitted manufacturers' sanctions against nonsigners of resale price
maintenance agreements.5 0
Beginning as early as 1948, state fair trade legislation began to lose
its effectiveness. Judicial decisions in large numbers of states reduced the
ability of wholesale sellers to police resale price maintenance. 5' In other
jurisdictions the legislation was held unconstitutional under state law.52
State fair trade met its ultimate demise with the passage of the Consumer
Goods Pricing Act of 1975, 53 which repealed both the Miller-Tydings
minimum price. Schwegmann defended, arguing that although the Louisiana fair trade statute con-
tained a nonsigner clause, such clauses violated the Sherman Act because the Miller-Tydings Act did
not authorize their use in interstate commerce. Id. at 387-88; see also Sunbeam Corp. v. Wentling,
185 F.2d 903 (3d Cir. 1950) (Pennsylvania Fair Trade Act held inapplicable to interstate sales and
advertising).
50. Act of July 14, 1952, ch. 745, 66 Stat. 631 (repealed by the Consumer Goods Pricing Act of
1975, Pub. L. No. 94-145, 89 Stat. 801).
51. See Herman, Fair Trade: Origins, Purposes, and Competitive Effects, 27 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 621, 621 (1959). Mail order houses located in non-fair trade states began to sell products in
fair trade states at discount prices. Courts held that the sales took place in the vendors' states, and
thus were not actionable. See, e.g., Bissell Carpet Sweeper Co. v. Masters Mail Order Co., 240 F.2d
684, 687-88 (4th Cir. 1957); General Electric Co. v. Masters Mail Order Co., 244 F.2d 681, 684-85
(2d Cir. 1957); Revere Camera Co. v. Masters Mail Order Co., 128 F. Supp. 457, 463-64 (D. Md.
1955). Obviously, this opened a major loophole in effective resale price maintenance.
Trade-in allowances and, perhaps more importantly, the advent of trading stamps also undercut
the effect of resale price maintenance policies. Indeed, the use of trading stamps to evade fair trade
provoked a good deal of law review commentary on the subject. See, e.g., Note, Trading Stamps and
Fair Trade Laws, 58 Nw. U.L. REV. 414 (1963); Note, Trading Stamps, 37 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1090
(1962).
52. ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 9 (1975).
53. Pub. L. No. 94-145, 89 Stat. 801 (1975). The Antitrust Division has taken the position that
Congress, through repeal of the Miller-Tydings and McGuire Acts, did not legislate a rule of per se
illegality for resale price maintenance:
There is. . . no necessary incongruity between the action of Congress in repealing the
[Miller-Tydings and McGuire Acts] and a rule of reason treatment of [resale price mainte-
nance] under the Sherman Act. The [federal] Fair Trade Laws were far too sweeping a
determination of per se legality, and [the Antitrust Division] agree[s] that they ought to
have been repealed. In [the Antitrust Division's] judgment, the action of Congress in 1976
[sic] does not preclude the Supreme Court from reaching a conclusion that, although [re-
sale price maintenance] continues to be per se illegal in those contexts in which it might
facilitate horizontal collusion, it should be treated under the rule of reason in other con-
texts. Although both the House and Senate reports indicate awareness that the Supreme
Court had previously declared [resale price maintenance] illegal per se and no doubt ex-
pected that they were remitting [resale price maintenance] to that status by repealing the
[Miller-Tydings and McGuire Acts], it is also true that there is nothing in the legislative
history which indicates a congressional disposition to limit the power of the courts to con-
tinue, through interpretation, the evolution and adaptation of the Sherman Act in light of
the continuing development of microeconomic analysis.
Baxter Letter, supra note 14, at 56,012 (footnote omitted). See also T. OVERSTREET, supra note 12,
at 8; Bork, Vertical Restraints: Schwinn Overruled, 1977 Sup. CT. REv. 171, 191-92.
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Amendment and the McGuire Act. Thus, today, the Sherman Act alone
states the standard by which resale price maintenance is judged.
C. Permissible Alternatives to Resale Price Maintenance.
Faced with legal obstacles to resale price maintenance, companies
desiring to police their customers' pricing policies employ other tech-
niques. Vertical integration is an obvious example, but one that might be
inefficient in many circumstances.5 4 Vertical integration, assuming the
absence of merger problems, eliminates the arguable presence of a con-
tract, combination, or conspiracy because divisions of the same company
and wholly-owned subsidiaries cannot conspire with each other.55
When vertical integration is either inefficient or presents legal
problems, a firm may employ sales on consignment as an alternative. Be-
cause the retailer does not have title in the goods and sells them as an
agent for the manufacturer, there can be no conspiracy. In United States
v. General Electric Co.,56 the Supreme Court rejected the government's
contention that a seller who retained title to its products and consigned
them to agents for sale at set prices employed illegal resale price mainte-
nance. The Court observed that "genuine contracts of agency" are unob-
jectionable because the owner can properly fix the price at which his
agents "transfer the title from him directly to such consumer. '57 In
1964, however, the Court reached a quite different conclusion in Simpson
v. Union Oil Co. 58 There, the defendant's consignment of gasoline to in-
dependent dealers subject to a set retail price was found to be objectiona-
ble as an antitrust subterfuge. It must be noted, however, that the Court
acknowledged that bona fide consignments might still be insulated from
antitrust scrutiny. Because it is exceedingly difficult to reconcile the two
decisions, 59 many have assumed that Simpson rejected, albeit sub silentio,
the Court's earlier logic in General Electric.60 This conclusion is given
additional support by the fact that in 1973 the government successfully
54. See Mathewson & Winter, An Economic Theory of Vertical Restraints, 15 RAND J. EcON.
27, 29 (1984).
55. See, e.g., Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 104 S. Ct. 2731, 2742 (1984); H &
B Equip. Co. v. International Harvester Co., 577 F.2d 239, 244 (5th Cir. 1978); see generally DEVrL-
OPMENTS, supra note 1, at 13 & n.92.
56. 272 U.S. 476 (1926).
57. Id. at 488.
58. 377 U.S. 13 (1964).
59. See id. at 26-28 & n.1 (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("The fact of the matter is, so far as the
record now before us discloses, the two agreements are virtually indistinguishable. Instead of ex-
pressly overruling General Electric, however, the Court seeks to distinguish that case upon the spe-
cious ground that its underpinnings rest on patent law." (footnote omitted)).
60. See, e.g., Note, Antitrust-Resale Price Maintenance Through Coercive Consignment Agree-
ment Is Illegal Under the Antitrust Laws, 43 TEx. L. REv. 569, 574 (1965).
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challenged General Electric's consignment system-the very one previ-
ously held to be legal.61 Nonetheless, many lower courts have continued
to uphold the establishment of resale prices in the context of a bona fide
consignment.62
The enactment of state fair trade laws and the federal enabling legis-
lation associated with them, taken together with consignment arrange-
ments and the Colgate doctrine, indicate that the law has permitted
resale price maintenance to exist in many contexts over the years. Since
the Court's decision in Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc. ,63 the
availability of nonprice vertical restraints to accomplish many of the
same objectives provides yet another illustration of judicial toleration of
the practice. Although nonprice vertical restraints, such as customer or
territorial restrictions, often have the same economic consequences as
vertical price constraints, the Court in GTE Sylvania indicated that it
would give nonprice vertical restraints more lenient scrutiny under a rule
of reason analysis, by assessing their impact on intrabrand and inter-
brand competition. This approach has usually resulted in upholding the
legality of nonprice vertical restraints. 64 Thus, the historical experience
illustrates that the law has not been consistent in its treatment of resale
price maintenance.
II. ANTITRUST POLICY AND RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE
Although economists have often observed that resale price mainte-
nance might have procompetitive effects under certain circumstances,
Professor Lester Telser rekindled the debate by posing the important
question of why manufacturers would want to impose a policy of resale
61. United States v. General Elec. Co., 358 F. Supp. 731, 743 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). See generally
DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 1, at 58 n.400.
62. See, e.g., Mesirow v. Pepperidge Farm, Inc., 703 F.2d 339, 341-43 (9th Cir. 1983); Harmick
v. Nu-Way Oil Co., 589 F.2d 806, 808-11 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 836 (1979); Pogue v.
International Indus., 524 F.2d 342, 346 (6th Cir. 1975). See generally ABA ANTITRUST SECTION,
MONOGRAPH No. 2, VERTICAL RESTRICTIONS LIMITING INTRABRAND COMPETITION 74-76, 84
(1977).
63. 433 U.S. 36 (1977). In Sylvania, the defendant granted a limited number of retail franchises
and required each franchisee to sell only from the location at which it was franchised. Id. at 38.
Plaintiff, a disenfranchised retailer, claimed that the defendant's franchise plan established territorial
restrictions on resale and was unlawful per se. Id. at 39-40. The Court held that the franchise
arrangement fell within the per se rule established in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388
U.S. 365 (1967), Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 45-47, but overturned the Schwinn per se rule. The Court
reviewed several procompetitive justifications for territorial restrictions, and concluded that a per se
rule was not appropriate. Id. at 51-58.




The manufacturers' interest seems to be best served when distributors
resell their products under such competitive conditions as may exist at
the level of distribution and at the lowest prices resulting from that
competition. If manufacturers set a floor to the resale price, then they
also set a ceiling to their sales and thus apparently support a policy
that runs counter to their own self-interest. Let the manufacturers fix
a price at the factory gate at which all distributors may buy the prod-
uct. Would not the manufacturers' sales and profits be greater the
lower is the price at which distributors resell their products to custom-
ers? If so, then what explains the strong desire of some manufacturers
to prevent distributors from reselling their product at prices below the
level set by the manufacturers? 66
This question merits serious consideration. A desire to increase the re-
sale price is no answer because a manufacturer could accomplish that
simply by raising its price to its wholesale customers, and garner the
higher revenues for itself. Generally, then, a manufacturer will benefit
from keen competition among its resellers because it ensures the highest
volume and the lowest distribution margin.
Professor Telser suggested two quite different reasons that might ex-
plain what appears to be perverse behavior by manufacturers: subsidiza-
tions of product-related services and maintenance of the optimum
number of retail outlets. Both motives are legitimate, and neither pose
an inevitable threat to consumer welfare. First, the volume of retail sales
may depend on both the retail price and the product-related services pro-
65. Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J. L. & EcoN. 86 (1960); see also
Bowman, The Prerequisites and Effects of Resale Price Maintenance, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 825, 832-43
(1955).
Three conditions must be met for resale price maintenance to be in the manufacturer's best
interest:
First, demand for the product must be a function of the service level as well as the price.
Secondly, the service must be such that it is best provided by retailers, and not by the
manufacturer. Finally, benefits from the service provision must not be fully appropriable
by the providing retailer.
Oster, The FTC v. Levi Strauss: An Analysis of the Economic Issues, in IMPACT EVALUATION OF
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION VERTICAL RESTRAINT CASES 48, 60 (1984).
66. Telser, supra note 65, at 86-87. Former Assistant Attorney General William F. Baxter
considered a similar question in his correspondence to Representative Robert MeClory:
If mere elevation of resale price were the purpose of [resale price maintenance], a
manufacturer could achieve that result by raising its own price to the distributor and cap-
ture revenues commensurate with that higher price. Under resale price maintenance, he
does not do that: he insists on a high retail price but permits the retailer to keep the
revenues that derive from that higher price; and at the same time he accepts the conse-
quence that a smaller quantity of his product will be sold because it is to be sold at a higher
price. One cannot suppose that manufacturers, to their own detriment in terms of their
sales volume, insist on conduct that can only fatten their distributors' profit margins and
lessen their own. Plainly, manufacturers who wish to employ resale price maintenance,
and who seek out distributors who are willing to enter contracts in which they promise to
comply, have some other end in view.
Baxter Letter, supra note 14, at 56,007.
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vided by retailers. Absent resale price maintenance, one might expect to
see different types of retailers providing different levels of services at dif-
ferent prices to consumers. Those customers who desire greater service
would pay more, while those desiring less would pay less. This all works
well unless some buyers, and their vendors, are able to "free ride" on the
product-related services provided by others.67
Although elimination of the "free ride" in the product services area
is a plausible explanation of manufacturers' interest in resale price main-
tenance, some authorities dispute the reality of this concern. Federal
Trade Commissioner Patricia P. Bailey has opined that the free-rider
problem is like the Loch Ness Monster: nearly everyone has heard of it,
but no one has ever really seen it.68 Perhaps the problem is rather that
the practice is so usual and widespread that it goes unnoticed.
Consider, for example, the law student who has received a $500
wedding gift with which to purchase a stereo system. Student and spouse
visit a specialty stereo store to investigate various equipment. The store
is pleasant, well-appointed, and has good acoustics. Patrons can sit com-
fortably and listen to demonstrations of the store's products. The sales-
person is knowledgeable about all of the store's wares, their features, and
comparative values. Student and spouse indicate that they have $500 to
spend, but are unsure whether to invest more in the amplifier than in
speakers. Should they purchase a tape deck, or forego a tape deck at this
time and buy a better grade turntable? And so on. The salesperson helps
them test numerous combinations of components. Student and spouse
try all the various possibilities-taking good notes all the while-and
tentatively decide on an expensive amplifier, a moderately priced turnta-
ble, and inexpensive speakers. A tape deck will have to wait. They then
indicate to the salesperson that they would like to think about it for a
couple of hours, and inquire as to the store's closing time. Student and
spouse thank the salesperson, leave, and race to a local discount store.
The discount store has no amenities, no opportunity to test the merchan-
dise, no knowledgeable sales personnel. Rather, student and spouse sim-
ply fill out an order form reflecting their selections from a catalog and
hand it to the sales clerk. The goods arrive via conveyor belt from the
second floor.
Loch Ness Monster? Rather obviously the hypothetical consumers
and their discount store retailer take a "free ride" on the services pro-
vided by the initial retailer. This phenomenon has been appropriately
67. Telser, supra note 65, at 89-96.
68. Oversight of FTC Law Enforcement: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trans-
portation, and Tourism of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 52
(1984) (statement of FTC Commissioner Patricia Bailey).
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described as the "browse here, buy there" strategy.69 A manufacturer,
confronted with facts similar to those described above, might want to
impose resale price maintenance in an effort to insure the appropriate
level of point-of-sale service. It should be noted that, under these condi-
tions, resale price maintenance would be output-enhancing; a manufac-
turer must believe that the quantity sold will increase as a result of
dealer-provided services; otherwise the manufacturer would not utilize
resale price maintenance. Given these circumstances, resale price main-
tenance would not pose anticompetitive consequences and therefore
should not be condemned under an antitrust rubric. 70
69. See Oster, supra note 65, at 61. The Antitrust Division has described this "browse here,
buy there" strategy similarly:
[I]f some distributors are incurring costs by [providing point-of-sale services] and are
selling at a higher price which cover [sic] those costs, while other distributors are not doing
so and sell at lower retail prices, then the free rider phenomenon will appear. A substantial
number of customers will go to the higher price outlet, will consume the time of sales
personnel there to obtain the appropriate counseling, but will then leave without buying
and purchase from a low cost outlet instead. It will prove to be impossible for some retail-
ers to afford expensive point of sale services for which it is not practicable to impose a
separate charge if other distributors are not doing so and are selling at prices which reflect
the cost savings of not doing so. If the manufacturer is to be successful in controlling the
manner in which his product is sold and the quality of point of sale services afforded in
conjunction with the sale of his product, he must be able to shelter the gross margins of
those distributors who are complying with his wishes from the pricing pressure of distribu-
tors who are not.
Baxter Letter, supra note 14, at 56,008.
A very real example of the "browse here, buy there" strategy appeared in Washingtonian maga-
zine, where the practice of browsing through Washington, D.C. furniture showrooms but buying
from North Carolina discount furniture merchants was described. Sullivan, Furniture Without
Tears, WASHINGTONIAN, Mar. 1974, at 80, 96. The personal computer market, with its necessary
emphasis on some source of service and advice, provides yet another example of a nonillusory free-
rider situation. Cf infra notes 87 & 119; notes 154-61 and accompanying text.
70. Professor William Comanor has recently observed that Telser's analysis, while providing an
answer in terms of descriptive economics, did not address the normative question of whether the
additional dealer services justify the higher prices charged. Comanor, Vertical Price Fixing and
Marketing Restrictions and the New Antitrust Policy, Working Paper No. 235, Dept. of Econ.,
Univ. of Calif. at Santa Barbara (Apr. 1984) (on file with the authors).
Robert Bork first addressed this question nearly twenty years ago. See Bork, The Rule of Rea-
son and the Per Se Concept. Price Fixing and Market Division, Pt. 11, 75 YALE L.J. 373 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as The Rule of Reason]. Bork argued that, in order for a manufacturer to maxi-
mize its own output, it must not hinder competition among those who resell its products. Generally,
resale restrictions are anticompetitive, and a rational manufacturer will never opt for them. Insofar
as a manufacturer does impose such restrictions, it must be assumed that the goal is to increase
output and so serve competitive goals that parallel the interests of consumers. Id. at 403.
But Comanor observes:
While consumer prices are generally increased through the imposition of these restraints,
more services are also provided. As a result, the normative question of whether the addi-
tional services are worth the increased cost is not answered by a simple test dealing with
the quantity sold of the manufactured product.
Comanor, supra, at 10. Bork's critics question an assumption implicit in his analysis: that consum-
ers who buy the product due to resale-price-maintenance-induced services are representative of all
consumers who buy the product. If "marginal" consumers who will only buy the product when the
services are included place a substantially higher value on those services than other consumers of the
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The other procompetitive explanation for the employment of resale
price maintenance is its potential for assuring an efficient number of re-
tail outlets. Theoretically, resale price maintenance would be utilized
when additional outlets produce gains that exceed the costs of reduced
demand resulting from the higher prices of protected resale margins.71
The first necessary condition under this explanation is that there must be
at least two types of retail establishments, each with a different cost
structure. Second, availability of the product through a variety of retail-
ers must induce more demand than the lower unprotected prices of fewer
outlets. Third, each type of outlet must have customers who regularly
patronize it as well as customers who price-shop. 72 Under these circum-
stances, higher-cost retailers would lose sales to those price sensitive cus-
tomers who overlap both high- and low-cost sellers. If higher-cost sellers
would lose sufficient numbers of customers to warrant dropping the
product, a manufacturer would have an efficiency-enhancing rationale
for employing resale price maintenance. In other words, resale price
maintenance may be employed to purchase display space in higher-cost
outlets. As Overstreet has observed, "an astute manufacturer will em-
product, then it is possible that welfare will be reduced when vertical restraints are added, and
Bork's rule would not hold. The intuition behind this is clear. To induce services, vertical restraints
must be added. These restraints theoretically could raise or lower the price to consumers. With an
increase in price, there will be consumers who, like those who previously purchased the product
without the service, will not be better off because they value the service at less than the price in-
crease. For those that would buy the product only when service is included, they might value the
service by more than the price increase. Depending on the size of the price increase, and on which
group of consumers is larger, net aggregate welfare may either increase or decrease.
Professors Gould and Yamey have noted that if all or most manufacturers, in an effort to insure
brand support, employ resale price maintenance, "the competitive sales-increasing effect would be
neutralized; and, other things being equal, total sales would be smaller." Gould & Yamey, Professor
Bork on Vertical Price Fixing, 76 YALE L.J. 722, 724 (1967). Thus, while the intent behind imple-
mentation of resale price maintenance might be output-enhancing, the net effect might be output-
reducing. Comanor explains that "actions of individual firms depend on the slope and position of
the relevant firm demand curves, while normative conclusions rest on market demand curves."
Comanor, supra, at 12. Bork later agreed that a manufacturer employing resale price maintenance
adds "to his manufactured article the information and promotion supplied by the reseller." Bork, A
Reply to Professors Gould and Yamey, 76 YALE L.J. 731, 733 (1967). But he responded to Gould
and Yamey's output restriction observation by stating that such a situation could not remain stable:
some manufacturers will abandon the services in order to obtain greater profits. Id. at 734-35. For
an interesting critique of Bork's response, see Comanor, supra, at 13-16. See also Spence, Monopoly,
Quality, and Regulation, 6 BELL J. ECON. 417 (1975).
71. See T. OVERSTREET, supra note 12, at 45; see also Gould & Preston, Resale Price Mainte-
nance and Retail Outlets, 32 ECONOMICA 302, 303-11 (1965). One would not expect to see resale
price maintenance where retailers were equally efficient because uniform mark-ups are characteristic
of a competitive environment. See T. OVERSTREET, supra note 12, at 46.
72. Sellers face a distinct demand curve absent customer overlap; in that situation one would
not expect to find resale price maintenance. On the other hand, if all sellers had common customers
they would face the same demand curve, and one would expect that customers would purchase at
the lowest price. See T. OVERSTREET, supra note 12, at 46.
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ploy [resale price maintenance] only when on balance the gains from
wider distribution more than offset the effects of higher margains. ' '73
Of course, there are also anticompetitive explanations for resale
price maintenance. Manufacturers can use resale price maintenance to
police cheating by participants in a manufacturers' cartel.74 The pres-
ence of a manufacturers' cartel does not necessarily dictate that resellers
will employ uniform pricing. Where some retailers discount, it may sim-
ply reflect a local, individualized pricing policy harmless to the cartel;
but, alternatively, it might indicate that the resellers' supplier has dis-
counted to the reseller in violation of the illegal cartel agreement. Inter-
pretation of retail discounting may be difficult, and while the imposition
of resale price maintenance does not eliminate a cartel member's incen-
tive to cheat, it does eliminate a variable that would otherwise complicate
cartel surveillance.
Another improper use of resale price maintenance is as the "cat's
paw" of a dealers' cartel. 75 Manufacturers may impose resale price
maintenance in an effort to police cheating by recalcitrant cartel mem-
bers. Manufacturers' agents or participating retailers could then monitor
dealer adherence to the set price. Recalcitrant dealers can be disciplined
by the manufacturer. Note that the manufacturer in this situation is co-
erced to establish and maintain as the set price the dealers' cartel monop-
oly prioe, rather than the price that yields the optimum distribution
margin to the manufacturer. Overstreet aptly summarizes this scenario:
"a detection and punishment mechanism, which it is hoped will deter
price cutters, is set in place that uses the manufacturer (vertically) to
police the [resale price maintenance] and stabilize the retailers' (horizon-
tal) collusion."' 76 There is some evidence of dealer utilization of resale
price maintenance to enforce cartel behavior, but typically the resulting
price maintenance policy does not serve the manufacturer's interests. 77
In any event, it is doubtful that resale price maintenance by a dealer
73. Id. at 47; see also Gould & Preston, supra note 71, at 303-11.
74. See, e-g., Baxter Letter, supra note 14, at 56,009.
75. See, eg., id. at 56,009-10.
76. T. OVERSTREET, supra note 12, at 15.
77. For example, in 1935 Pepsodent refused to "fair trade" its toothpaste. Angry California
retailers organized a boycott of Pepsodent that almost completely eliminated Pepsodent sales in that
state. Not surprisingly, the toothpaste company changed its policy and implemented fair trade;
indeed, it issued a public apology to the retailers, and donated $25,000 to the organization that
organized the boycott. See McLaughlin Dissertation, supra note 40, at 14 (citing Gault, Fair
Trade-With Especial Reference to Cut-Rate Drug Prices in Michigan, 9 MICH. Bus. STUD. 2
(1939)); see also, T. OVERSTREET, supra note 12, at 145-46 n.2 (citing FTC, REPORT OF THE FTC
ON RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE 143 (1945)); Overstreet & Fisher, supra note 3, at 12-13.
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cartel is commonplace. 78
From time to time observers focus on fact situations that do not
seem to fit any of the proffered explanations for resale price mainte-
nance. 79 The Levi Strauss case80 is an often-cited example.81 Indeed, one
commentator has noted that resale price maintenance was not likely to
have been in Levi Strauss's self-interest because the company seems to
have fared better after it abandoned the policy. 82 However, it may be
that what appears to be minimum resale price maintenance is really not
that at all. Levi Strauss may have utilized maximum price setting in an
effort to allocate a temporarily scarce product. Consider the following
possible explanation. 83
During the relevant period, Levi Strauss faced an unanticipated de-
mand for its product. While its traditional customers were in large mea-
sure blue collar, agricultural, and construction workers, blue denim had
become de rigueur for large numbers of people who had not worn blue
denim since childhood. Jeans, high heels, and silk blouses were in vogue
at cocktail parties. Demand for this new "high fashion" product rapidly
exceeded available supply. Increased supply was not feasible in the short
run. The production of denim requires a substantial capital investment.
Fashion is fickle. It was not at all clear that blue denim would continue
to find favor with the quiche and camembert crowd. Naturally, there
would be some reluctance to make the necessary investment when the
increased demand might be very short term. When demand exceeds sup-
78. The necessary conditions for successful horizontal price collusion will not often be present
in resale price maintenance cases. See Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of Reason,
53 ANTITRUST L.J. 135, 142-43 (1984). For an empirical survey of conditions favorable to horizon-
tal cartel behavior, see Hay & Kelley, An Empirical Survey of Price Fixing Conspiracies, 17 J. LAW &
ECON. 13 (1974).
79. See, e.g., Marvel & McCafferty, Resale Price Maintenance and Quality Certification (Apr.
1983) (describing Kellogg's cornflakes, Bon Ami cleanser, and Gillette safety razors as examples of
products involving anomalous uses of resale price maintenance) (draft manuscript; on file with the
authors).
80. On May 5, 1976, the FTC filed a complaint alleging that the Levi Strauss Company had
engaged in illegal resale price maintenance. Levi Strauss & Co., [1973-1976 Transfer Binder] TRADE
REG. REP. (CCH) 21,135 (May 5, 1976). Numerous state attorneys general filed similar actions.
See, e.g., Tennessee ex rel. Leech v. Levi Strauss & Co., 1980-2 TRADE CAS. 63,558 (Tenn. Ch.
Sept. 25, 1980); cf Connecticut v. Levi Strauss & Co., 471 F. Supp. 363, 368 (D. Conn. 1979)
(potential for "a series of what [Levi Strauss] term[ed] costly and duplicative suits in the courts of
different states"). The FTC's action resulted in a cease and desist consent order in July, 1978. In re
Levi Strauss & Co., 92 F.T.C. 171 (1978).
81. See, e.g., Marvel, supra note 42.
82. See Oster, supra note 65, at 73-75, 82. Oster concluded that resale price maintenance made
sense for Levi Strauss at one time, but was no longer in the company's interest when the FTC
brought its case. Id. at 73-76.
83. It is not our intention to hypothesize about the actual case, but only to proffer an alternative
explanation for a complex fact situation. For a contrary explanation of the case, see id. at 62, 65, 81.
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ply, it is usual to permit the price mechanism to allocate the product to
those who value it most. But Levi Strauss might have feared that al-
lowing the price to be bid up would result in purchases by its new cus-
tomers, with its old customers turning elsewhere, perhaps to khaki. In a
year or two its new customers might have found their fashion elsewhere
and-more importantly-its old customers might have transferred their
loyalty to another product. Faced with this situation, might not Levi
Strauss have employed maximum pricing as a temporary policy to allo-
cate its product until the short-run increase in demand lapsed or until the
necessary capital investment could be justified and the supply increased?
Thus, what may appear to be minimum resale price maintenance may in
fact be nothing more than a policy that is benign and not
anticompetitive. 84
Yet another reason for manufacturers to enter into resale price
maintenance programs is to obtain "quality certification" for their prod-
ucts. 85 Although there is some similarity to Professor Telser's classic
"free rider" analysis, 86 the two scenarios are different.87 Customers
clearly regard some dealers as capable of certifying product quality; other
dealers are less able to do so. Naturally, manufacturers prefer to see
their merchandise sold in "leading stores" in order to obtain quality cer-
tification and thus increase demand for their product.88 The sale of a
84. However, the Supreme Court's opinion in Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 153 (1968),
found maximum resale price maintenance to be per se illegal as well. See also Arizona v. Maricopa
County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 348-49 (1982); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram &
Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951). Lower courts have generally applied the per se rule against maximum
resale price maintenance. See, e.g., Arnott v. American Oil Co., 609 F.2d 873, 885 (8th Cir. 1979)
(citing Albrecht), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 918 (1980); cf Auburn News Co. v. Providence Journal Co.,
659 F.2d 273, 277 (1st Cir. 1981) (although maximum price fixing is per se illegal, preliminary
injunctive relief is available only if it is shown that there is no adequate remedy at law), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 921 (1982).
85. See generally Marvel & McCafferty, supra note 79.
86. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
87. Marvel and McCafferty have described this difference as follows:
The Telser argument is that retailers are superior to manufacturers in providing services
because they are capable of tailoring services to the particular needs of their customers.
For example, the manufacturer of a personal computer could advertise the capabilities of
its product and the requisite peripheral devices and software in general terms, but much of
this information would be irrelevant to potential customers contemplating specialized uses,
In contrast, the retailer could respond specifically to the user's needs. But to insure these
services would be provided, the manufacturer would need to redirect competition among
dealers from a price focus to a service focus. The remaining competition would neverthe-
less serve to prevent rents from being earned in equilibrium.
The quality certification argument presented here does not require that the services be
tailored to particular customers. The quality signals provided by stores offering the prod-
uct do not require additional efforts by firms beyond an investigation of whether the prod-
uct in question is of a quality level consonant with the retailer's reputation.
Marvel & McCafferty, supra note 79, at 7-8.
88. Sale of a manufacturer's goods by stores of assured quality contributes to consumers' per-
ception of the quality of the goods. This does not involve the services or facilities provided to the
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branded product to all types of dealers, however, provides some retailers
an opportunity to free ride on those in the "leading stores" category.
The solution is either to refuse to sell to discounters or to attempt to
ensure the margin necessary to finance the desired ambiance. This expla-
nation may have particular application to the apparel market. Unfortu-
nately, the consumer welfare consequences of resale price maintenance in
this setting are ambiguous.
Resale price maintenance can have both efficiency-enhancing and
anticompetitive consequences, depending on the facts and circumstances.
Recognition of the potential procompetitive effect of resale price mainte-
nance is perhaps the most compelling argument for its treatment under
the rule of reason. Of course some of the efficiency-enhancing attributes
of resale price maintenance can be obtained by employing other vertical
restraints, such as exclusive territories. That is not to say that other dis-
tribution policies are equally efficient substitutes.89 Bork has observed
that sellers will opt for resale price maintenance over locational restraints
where the cost of shipment to the dealers' locations is low compared to
the price of the goods. Exclusive territories, on the other hand, are at-
tractive when transportation costs are large in relation to the total price
of the product.90 Thus, one would expect to see resale price maintenance
with reference to watches, and exclusive territories for the sale of
automobiles. 91
III. THE MONSANTO CASE
Monsanto, a herbicide manufacturer, held a fifteen percent market
share in the late 1960's, while its principal competitor, Ciba-Geigy, pos-
sessed seventy percent of the market.92 In an effort to increase its market
share, Monsanto sought to educate its distributors and their customers
consumer-pleasant changing rooms and patient sales personnel in the apparel trade, for example-
but is a less tangible indicia of quality. See Oster, supra note 65, at 62-63.
89. See Baxter Letter, supra note 14, at 56,008-09 (footnote omitted):
It is true, of course, that [resale price maintenance] is not the only vehicle available to
a manufacturer to shelter his distributors' margins to the degree necessary to facilitate
provision of point of sale services. He may engage in direct distribution by his own em-
ployees. . . . He may create geographic breathing room for his distributors by authoriz-
ing each to sell only from a designated location and maintaining adequate spatial
separation of those locations, the practice that was upheld in GTE-Sylvania. He may cre-
ate exclusive territorial distributorships, a practice that is economically indistinguishable
from the practice involved in GTE-Sylvania, or he may use resale price maintenance. One
technique will be more successful in some circumstances, another more successful in an-
other; but all the techniques have essentially the same economic consequences.
See also T. OVERSTREEr, supra note 12, at 167-68.
90. Bork, The Rule of Reason, supra note 70, at 429-464; see also Posner, The Next Step in the
Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. REv. 6, 9 (1981).
91. McLaughlin Dissertation, supra note 40, at 20.
92. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 104 S. Ct. 1464, 1466 (1984).
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about the merits of its herbicides. In 1967 the company changed its dis-
tribution policy and announced that distributors would be reappointed
for only one-year terms. It predicated renewal on whether a distributor's
primary line of business was the marketing of Monsanto's products to
dealers and whether the distributor employed trained personnel capable
of developing educational programs for dealers and their customers.
These changes, together with the introduction of new products, seemed
to produce results. Indeed, Monsanto's market share almost doubled
during a four-year period.93 The focus on point-of-sale education was
apparently successful.
In 1968 Monsanto informed Spray-Rite, a discount distributor of
herbicide, that its contract would not be renewed. Approximately eighty
percent of Spray-Rite's sales were of Ciba-Geigy herbicides, while only
sixteen percent were of Monsanto products. Spray-Rite brought suit
against Monsanto, alleging that Monsanto's decision not to renew the
distributorship was based on a failure to abide by Monsanto's resale price
maintenance policy, and that such a practice constituted vertical price-
fixing under the Sherman Act.94
The trial court instructed the jury that Monsanto's conduct was per
se unlawful if it was in furtherance of a conspiracy to fix prices. The jury,
in answer to special interrogatories, found that the termination was pur-
suant to a conspiracy between Monsanto and one or more of its distribu-
tors to set resale prices. 95 The jury award of $3.5 million in damages to
Spray-Rite was trebled to $10.5 million. The Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit affirmed.96 That court held that "proof of termination
following competitor complaints is sufficient to support an inference of
concerted action. '97 As the Supreme Court later phrased the rule an-
nounced by the court of appeals, "an antitrust plaintiff can survive a mo-
tion for directed verdict if it shows that a manufacturer terminated a
93. Id. at 1467.
94. Id.
95. The special interrogatories, to each of which the jury answered "yes," were as follows:
1. Was the decision by Monsanto not to offer a new contract to plaintiff for 1969
made by Monsanto pursuant to a conspiracy or combination with one or more of its dis-
tributors to fix, maintain or stabilize resale prices of Monsanto herbicides?
2. Were the compensation programs and/or areas of primary responsibility, and/or
shipping policy created by Monsanto pursuant to a conspiracy to fix, maintain or stabilize
resale prices of Monsanto herbicides?
3. Did Monsanto conspire or combine with one or more of its distributors so that one
or more of those distributors would limit plaintiffs access to Monsanto herbicides after
1968?
Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 684 F.2d, 1226, 1233 (7th Cir. 1982), affid, 104 S. Ct. 1464
(1984).
96. Id. at 1251.
97. Id. at 1238.
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price-cutting distributor in response to or following complaints by other
distributors. ' 98 Because that holding brought the Seventh Circuit into
direct conflict with several other courts of appeals,99 the Supreme Court
granted certiorari. 100
Monsanto is noteworthy for several reasons. First, the appearance
by the United States as amicus curiae on behalf of Monsanto made it
unusual. More importantly, then-Assistant Attorney General William F.
Baxter sought to use the case as a vehicle for testing the per se illegality
of resale price maintenance. Congressional reaction to the planned ap-
pearance by the Antitrust Division on the resale price maintenance ques-
tion insured notoriety. 10' Second, the case afforded the Court an
opportunity to discuss the vitality of the Colgate doctrine. And, third,
the issue actually presented by the case-what quality of proof is neces-
sary to give rise to an inference of a contract, combination, or conspir-
acy-was important because dealer termination cases account for such a
large share of the antitrust case universe."' 2
98. Monsanto, 104 S. Ct. at 1468.
99. The Supreme Court summarized the state of the law as follows:
The court below recognized that its standard was in conflict with that articulated in Ed-
ward J Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d 105, 110-111 (CA3 1980), cert.
denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981). Other circuit courts also have rejected the standard adopted
by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. See Schwimmer v. Sony Corp. ofAmerica,
677 F.2d 946, 952-953 (CA2), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1007 (1982); Davis-Watkins Co. v.
Service Merchandise, 686 F.2d 1190, 1199 (CA6 1982), cert. pending, No. 82-848; Bruce
Drug, Inc v. Hollister, Inc., 688 F.2d 853, 856-857 (CAl 1982); see also Blankenship v.
Herzfeld, 661 F.2d 840, 845 (CA10 1981). The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
has adopted the Seventh Circuit's standard. See Bostick Oil Co. v. Michelin Tire Corp., 702
F.2d 1207, 1213-1215 (CA4 1983). One panel of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit also has adopted that standard, see Battle v. Lubrizol Corp., 673 F.2d 984, 990-992
(CA8 1982), while another appears to have rejected it in an opinion issued the same day,
see Roesch, Inc. v. Star Cooler Corp., 671 F.2d 1168, 1172 (CA8 1982). On rehearing en
banc, the Court of Appeals was equally divided between the two positions. Compare Battle
v. Watson, 712 F.2d 1238 (CA8 1983) (en banc); Roesch, Inc v. Star Cooler Corp., 712 F.2d
1235 (CA8 1983) (en banc).
Id. at 1468 n.5.
100. 460 U.S. 1010 (1983).
101. Seesupra note 1. In its amicus brief the Department of Justice took the view that "[t]here
is no sound basis for assuming, as courts have since Dr. Miles. . ., that resale price maintenance is
so invariably anticompetitive as to justify per se condemnation." Brief for United States as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 6, Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 104 S. Ct. 1464 (1984).
The Department concluded that "the logic of Sylvania compels the conclusion that resale price
maintenance-like other vertical restrictions-is unsuitable for per se treatment." Id. at 19. See also
Baxter Letter, supra note 14, at 56,012-13 (urging the Antitrust Division to seek judicial reconsidera-
tion of the per se rule against resale price maintenance).
102. See NATIONAL ECONOMIC RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, INC., A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF
PRIVATE ANTITRUST LITIGATION: FINAL REPORT 27-31 (1979) (prepared for the ABA Section of
Antitrust Law).
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A. The Per Se Quality of Resale Price Maintenance.
Despite the arguments of the Antitrust Division in its briefs, the
Supreme Court eschewed the opportunity to address squarely the per se
issue. The Court, in a footnote, observed that the case did not present an
"occasion to consider the merits of this argument." 10 3 The Court noted
that neither party had argued the per se issue in the district court or
raised it on appeal. Moreover, neither party pressed the argument ad-
vanced by the Antitrust Division in the Supreme Court. Accordingly,
the Court "declin[ed] to reach the question." 1°4 The Court, however, did
accept the Antitrust Division's argument that the distinction reflected in
the case law between price and nonprice restrictions does not make eco-
nomic sense. 105
Despite some interpretations to the contrary,10 6 Monsanto did not
explicitly affirm the rule-if it can be called that-of Dr. Miles. As al-
ready noted, the Court went to some length to state that the case did not
present an opportunity to consider the merits of the per se issue. 107 Jus-
tice Brennan's separate concurring opinion10 8 underscores the Court's
failure to affirm Dr. Miles. The existence of a separate concurring opin-
ion might well reflect a perception that the Court's opinion, delivered by
Justice Powell, fell short of the mark in paying obeisance to Dr. Miles. It
may reasonably be presumed that Justice Brennan sought-unsuccess-
fully-to have Dr. Miles clearly affirmed in the opinion of the Court.
Thus, the Court's opinion on this issue may be more interesting for what
was not said than for what was said, and the issue of whether resale price
maintenance ought to be treated under a per se rule is even more relevant
103. Monsanto, 104 S. Ct. at 1469 n.7.
104. Id. at 1470 n.7.
105. Id. at 1469-70 ("[Ihe economic effect of all of the conduct described. ..- unilateral and
concerted vertical price-setting, agreements on price and nonprice restrictions-is in many, but not
all, cases similar or identical." (citing United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 43 (1960)).
106. See, eg., Glen Eden Hosp. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 740 F.2d 423, 431 (6th Cir. 1984)
(Monsanto "affirmed" the per se rule); Zeidman & Mullenix, Distinctions in Monsanto Provide Little
Guidance, Leg. Times of Wash., Apr. 9, 1984, at 13, col. 1 ("[One fact emerges as crystal-clear[:]
• . . at least for the moment, Dr. Miles is alive and well."). Cf Letter from Rep. James J. Florio to
FTC Chairman James C. Miller, III (Apr. 10, 1984) (characterizing the Monsanto decision as a
"reaffirmation" of the per se illegality of resale price maintenance. "Congress has spoken. The
Supreme Court has spoken. I trust now that the Federal Trade Commission will do its duty."). But
see Bender v. Southland Corp., 1984-2 TRADE CAS. (CCH) 66,307, at 67,337 n.3 (6th Cir. Dec. 7,
1984) (observing that the Monsanto Court refused to reconsider the per se rule "adopted in Dr.
Miles" "on the ground that the defendants had not presented it either in the district court or on
appeal," and noting that the defendant in the instant case also had not raised the issue (emphasis
added)).
107. See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
108. Monsanto, 104 S. Ct. at 1473 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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after Monsanto than it was before. In some sense, the Court may be said
to have invited future litigation on this issue.
B. The Colgate Doctrine.
Perhaps the most important feature of the Court's opinion was its
rather clear reaffirmance of the Colgate doctrine. Colgate'0 9 held that a
manufacturer may announce a resale price maintenance policy and there-
after refuse to deal with retailers who failed to comply with that pol-
icy.110 In recent years many commentators have questioned the
continuing vitality of Colgate."' Indeed, in Russell Stover Candies,
Inc., 1 2 the FTC, seeking to confirm the suspicions of many that Colgate
was dead, brought what can only be described as a "test case" for the
purpose of challenging the Colgate doctrine.11 3 Not surprisingly, the
109. 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
110. See supra notes 17-3 8 and accompanying text.
111. Professor Lawrence Sullivan has queried "whether Colgate is not now more than outmo-
ded, whether its shade has not at last been quietly dispatched." L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF ANTITRUST 394 (1977). A good many courts have made similar observations. See, e.g.,
George W. Warner & Co. v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 277 F.2d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1960) ("[T]he
Supreme Court has left a narrow channel through which a manufacturer may pass even though the
facts would have to be of such Doric simplicity as to be somewhat rare in this day of complex
business enterprise."). Although some lower courts have continued to recognize the validity of Col-
gate, see, e.g., Official Airlines Guides, Inc. v. FTC, 630 F.2d 920, 927-28 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 917 (1981), other courts have narrowly restricted Colgate to its facts, see, e.g., Greene v.
General Foods Corp., 517 F.2d 635, 651-52 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 942 (1976), and
have proscribed anything beyond the mere announcement of a policy of resale price maintenance,
see, e.g., Quinn v. Mobil Oil Co., 375 F.2d 273, 275-76 (1st Cir.), cert. dismissed, 389 U.S. 801
(1967).
112. 100 F.T.C. 1 (1982).
113. According to FTC documents obtained by the Legal Times of Washington, the Russell
Stover case was the result of an effort by the Commission's Bureau of Competition to identify target
respondents engaged in Colgate-type activities; the Bureau intended to establish as a per se violation
of the antitrust laws the practice of suggesting resale prices, when such suggestions were combined
with clearly communicated threats of termination for selling below those prices. FTC Policy Briefing
Book on Cooperative Advertising, Colgate, Leg. Times of Wash., June 23, 1980, at 32, col. 1. The
Bureau of Competition summarized its intentions in its case protocol:
One may logically call upon the manufacturer who chooses to suggest resale prices to
answer for any activity which implies that it is trying to secure adherence to those prices-
including refusals to deal with noncomplaint [sic] distributors. Our objective is to make
Colgate expressly unavailable to the manufacturer who elects to maintain resale prices by
refusing to deal with or terminating discounters.
Id. at 33, col. 2. The Bureau of Competition identified three potential target companies-Russell
Stover (candies), Rolex (watches), and Fieldcrest (bed and bath linens). The New York Regional
Office identified another potential respondent-Jockey International (men's underwear, hosiery, and
sportswear). Id. Commissioner Pertschuk was Chairman of the FTC when Russell Stover was in its
formative stages. See Pertschuk, Report from the Federal Trade Commission, 48 ANTrrRUST L.J.
629 (1979) (outlining his antitrust enforcement priorities aimed at enhancing competition). Then-
Chairman Pertschuk noted in 1979 that "[a]lthough we will be attempting to define new approaches
to vertical restraints, resale price maintenance will remain our top priority in this area." Id. at 636.
Similarly, the FTC under Chairman Pertschuk attempted to expand per se applicability to nonprice
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Commission found little, if anything, left of the doctrine,1 14 but its ad-
ministrative determination was reversed by the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit.115 Judge McMillian, writing for that court, concluded
that any pronouncement on the continuing vitality of Colgate should be
left to the Supreme Court.1 16 Less than six months elapsed between the
decision of the Eighth Circuit in Russell Stover and the holding of the
Supreme Court in Monsanto that Colgate was in good health:
Section 1 of the Sherman Act requires that there be a "contract, com-
bination. . . or conspiracy" between the manufacturers and other dis-
tributors in order to establish a violation. . . . Independent action is
not proscribed. A manufacturer of course generally has a right to deal,
or refuse to deal, with whomever it likes, as long as it does so indepen-
dently. . . .Under Colgate, the manufacturer can announce its resale
prices in advance and refuse to deal with those who fail to comply. And
a distributor is free to acquiesce in the manufacturer's demand in order
to avoid termination.1 17
The Monsanto Court, in affirming the vitality of the Colgate doc-
trine, 118 noted that a manufacturer often has a legitimate interest in the
vertical restraints--contrary to Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977)-
and restrictive cooperative advertising programs-contrary to In re Nissan Antitrust Litigation, 577
F.2d 910 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1072 (1979)-and to limit the consignment exception
beyond Simpson v. Union Oil of California, 377 U.S. 13 (1964).
114. Commissioner Pertschuk, writing for the Commission, found Colgate limited to the deci-
sion to sell to a particular customer in the first instance: "[W]e believe this right of initial customer
selection is the meaning of Colgate as it stands today. . . . It does not mean that compliance with
the pricing policy in order to avoid termination . . . does not give rise to an agreement." Russell
Stover Candies, Inc., 100 F.T.C. 1, 46-47 (1982). The opinion made clear the Commission's view
that unwilling compliance by dealers to adhere to a manufacturer's announced policy of price main-
tenance gives rise to an illicit agreement:
An announced policy of terminating noncomplying dealers, standing alone, does not auto-
matically create a combination because such a policy standing alone does not necessarily
imply any dealers act to avoid the carrying out of the threat. However, if, as is likely, some
dealers do act to avoid termination, their unwilling compliance does give rise to combina-
tions. In short, an announced policy of terminating dealers for noncompliance would not
lead to agreements only if it had no effect in influencing dealer behavior, a principal reason
for announcing the policy in the first place. Thus, an announced policy of terminating
discounters, coupled with widespread compliance, with or without actual terminations,
should be adequate to support an inference that there is unwilling compliance and, hence,
that there are agreements.
Id. at 40-41 (emphasis in original; footnote omitted). Chairman Miller dissented from the Commis-
sion's opinion in Russell Stover, 100 F.T.C. at 50-53.
115. Russell Stover Candies, Inc. v. FTC, 718 F.2d 256 (8th Cir. 1983).
116. "If Colgate no longer stands for the proposition that a 'simple refusal to sell to customers
who will not sell at prices suggested by the seller is permissible under the Sherman Act,'. .. it is for
the Supreme Court, not this court, to so declare." Id. at 260.
117. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 104 S. Ct. 1464, 1469 (1984) (emphasis added).
The Eighth Circuit's opinion in Russell Stover was handed down on September 29, 1983; Monsanto
was decided on March 20, 1984.
118. The Federal Trade Commission was severely criticized for its refusal to petition the
Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari following the court of appeals' decision in Russell Stover. The
critics contended that the Supreme Court would reverse the Eighth Circuit. See, e.g., Letter from
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price at which its goods are sold by dealers or distributors:
A manufacturer and its distributors have legitimate reasons to ex-
change information about the prices and the reception of their prod-
ucts in the market. Moreover, it is precisely in cases in which the
manufacturer attempts to further a particular marketing strategy by
means of agreements on often costly nonprice restrictions that it will
have the most interest in the distributors' resale prices. The manufac-
turer often will want to ensure that its distributors earn sufficient profit
to pay for programs such as hiring and training additional salesmen or
demonstrating the technical features of the product, and will want to
see that 'free-riders" do not interfere [citing Sylvania]. Thus, the man-
ufacturer's strongly felt concern about resale prices does not necessarily
mean that it has done more than the Colgate doctrine allows.'19
Given that the Supreme Court has characterized per se illegal conduct as
"practices which because of their pernicious effect on competition and
lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasona-
ble and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm
they have caused or the business excuse for their use," 20 treating resale
price maintenance as per se illegal and, at the same time, recognizing a
manufacturer's legitimate interest in resale prices is not wholly immune
from criticism.
C. The Standard of Proof
One of the most important aspects of the Monsanto decision is the
Court's discussion of what a plaintiff must show in order to establish the
existence of concerted action and so avoid Colgate. The Seventh Circuit
had held that "proof of termination following competitor complaints is
Rep. James J. Florio to FTC Chairman James C. Miller, III (Dec. 2, 1983) (protesting that the
Rudman amendment to the 1983 appropriations act affecting the FTC and the Justice Department,
see supra note 11, was not a valid reason for refusing to appeal Russell Stover, because the case
sought to "reconfirm" the FTC's "enforcement capability").
119. 104 S. Ct. at 1470 (emphasis added). Compare Baxter Letter, supra note 14, at 56,008:
It is [the Antitrust Division's] judgment that manufacturers of certain types of products
often have legitimate reasons for wishing to control the distribution environment in which
those products are resold. If, for example, a product is technologically complex, its success
in the marketplace may well depend upon the availability, at the point of sale, of techni-
cally trained sales personnel who are able both to instruct the consumer and to assist him
in selecting the model, or the combination of components, that will best suit his individual
needs.
See also supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text. The Court's opinion in GTE Sylvania recognizes
additional legitimate reasons, other than preventing the free rider effect, for a manufacturer to exert
control over the manner in which its products are sold and serviced. Specifically, the Court men-
tions new market entry, Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 55 (1977); supra
notes 71-73 and accompanying text, and manufacturers' safety and warranty obligations under state
and federal law, GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 55 n.23.
120. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). For a thorough discussion of the
proper roles of the per se rule and the rule of reason in antitrust analysis, see Indiana Fed'n of
Dentists v. FTC, 745 F.2d 1124, 1131 n.8, 1138-40 (7th Cir. 1984).
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sufficient to support an inference of concerted action."1 21 The Supreme
Court rejected this standard but affirmed the judgment under a different
standard. This new standard, however, was not clearly defined.
The Court made it clear that an antitrust plaintiff must present evi-
dence sufficient to prove the existence of an agreement, and cautioned
that inferences of agreement must not be drawn from "highly ambiguous
evidence."122 Further, an inference of an agreement cannot be derived
from termination that follows dealer complaints. "[Complaints about
price-cutters 'are natural-and from the manufacturer's perspective, un-
avoidable-reactions by distributors to the activities of their rivals.'
Such complaints, particularly where the manufacturer has imposed a
costly set of nonprice restrictions, 'arise in the normal course of business
and do not indicate illegal concerted action.'"123 The Court observed
that "distributors are an important source of information for manufac-
turers. In order to assure an efficient distribution system, manufacturers
and distributors constantly must coordinate their activities to assure that
their products will reach the consumer persuasively and efficiently." 1 24
Thus, a manufacturer may act on dealer complaints in a reasonable and
legal exercise of business judgment. 125 In the Court's words, "something
more than evidence of complaints is needed." 126 There must also be evi-
dence "that tends to exclude" the possibility that the manufacturer and
nonterminated distributors acted independently. 127 More specifically,
the Court adopted the test employed by Judge Aldisert in Edward J
Sweeney & Sons v. Texaco, Inc. :128 "The antitrust plaintiff should pres-
ent direct or circumstantial evidence that reasonably tends to prove that
121. Monsanto, 684 F.2d at 1238. The Supreme Court noted that the Seventh Circuit opinion,
"later in the same paragraph, restated the standard of proof as follows: 'Proof of distributorship
termination in response to competing distributors' complaints about the terminated distributor's pric-
ing policies is sufficient to raise an inference of concerted action.'" Monsanto, 104 S. Ct. at 1468 n.4
(emphasis in original). The Court concluded that any difference in these formulations was of no
importance in its analysis, id. Cf. supra note 98 and accompanying text.
122. 104 S. Ct. at 1470.
123. Id. (quoting Roesch, Inc. v. Star Cooler Corp., 671 F.2d 1168, 1172 (8th Cir. 1982)).
124. Id. at 1470-71.
125. "To bar a manufacturer from acting solely because the information upon which it acts
originated as a price complaint would create an irrational dislocation in the market. In sum, '[to
permit the inference of concerted action on the basis of receiving complaints alone and thus to
expose the defendant to treble damage liability would both inhibit management's exercise of in-
dependent business judgment and emasculate the terms of the statute.'" Id. (quoting Edward J.
Sweeney & Sons v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d 105, 111 n.2 (3d Cir. 1989)).
126. Id. In Gillette Tire Jobbers v. Appliance Indus., Inc., 1984-2 TRADE CAS. (CCH) 66,231,
at 66,231-32 (E.D. La. Oct. 3, 1984), a district court found that, under Monsanto, complaints by
distributors followed by a reduction in the discount rate given plaintiff was insufficient to establish a
conspiracy.
127. 104 S. Ct. at 1471.
128. 637 F.2d 105 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981).
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the manufacturer and others 'had a conscious commitment to a common
scheme designed to achieve an unlawful objective.' "129
In the context of the Monsanto case, the Court reasoned that there
was sufficient evidence for the jury to have properly concluded that the
defendant and some of its distributors had entered into an agreement
sufficient to meet the contract, combination, or conspiracy requirement
of section one of the Sherman Act. Most importantly, Monsanto had
confronted a discounter and advised that termination would follow if the
suggested resale price was ignored. When the discounter did not assent,
Monsanto complained to the discounter's parent company which in-
structed its subsidiary to comply. Thereafter the discounter informed
Monsanto that it would charge the suggested price. 130 The Court found
that that evidence was both relevant and persuasive as to the agreement
issue.' 3 ' However, that incident, involving another discounter, not
Spray-Rite, occurred five months after Spray-Rite had been termi-
nated. 132 Thus, the evidence did not go directly to the issue of the termi-
nation of Spray-Rite.
Even more questionable was the Court's focus on a newsletter pre-
pared by a distributor for the dealers it served. The newsletter reported
that Monsanto officials had stated in a meeting with distributors that the
company wanted to "'get the market place in order' " and that, accord-
ingly, " 'every effort [was going to] be made to maintain a minimum mar-
ket price level.' 133 The Court observed that a jury might reasonably
interpret the newsletter as referring to an agreement on the part of dis-
tributors and retailers to adhere to Monsanto's resale price maintenance
scheme.134 On the other hand, a more reasonable interpretation of the
newsletter is that it merely reports that Monsanto had a policy of sug-
129. Monsanto, 104 S. Ct. at 1471 (quoting Edward J. Sweeney & Sons v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d
105, 111 (3rd Cir. 1980)).
130. Id. at 1471.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. The newsletter further stated:
"In other words, we are assured that Monsanto's company-owned outlets will not retail at
less than their suggested retail price to the trade as a whole. Furthermore, those of us on
the distributor level are not likely to deviate downward on price to anyone as the idea is
implied that doing this possibly could discolor the outlook for continuity as one of the
approved distributors during the future upcoming seasons. So, none interested in the reten-
tion of this arrangement is likely to risk being deleted from this customer service opportu-
nity. Also, so far as the national accounts are concerned, they are sure to recognize the
desirability of retaining Monsanto's favor on a continuing basis by respecting the wisdom
of participating in the suggested program in a manner assuring order on the retail level
'playground' throughout the entire country. It is elementary that harmony can only come
from following the rules of the game and that in case of dispute, the decision of the umpire
is final."
Id. at 1471-72.
134. Id. at 1472.
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gested retail prices and that it would terminate dealers who did not fol-
low those prices. Thus, it can be argued that the newsletter reflected only
that Monsanto had adopted and implemented a Colgate policy.
The Court then proceeded to discuss the nexus between evidence of
an agreement with one or more distributors and the termination of
Spray-Rite. The Court found that a jury could reasonably find the re-
quisite connection since "it is necessary for competing distributors con-
templating compliance with suggested prices to know that those who do
not comply will be terminated." 135 Unfortunately, the rationale of the
Court's conclusion is not self-evident. One might conclude that the
Court held that proof of a nexus is unnecessary. However, the Court did
find "some circumstantial evidence of such a link." 136 Following Spray-
Rite's termination, there was a meeting between officials of Spray-Rite
and Monsanto during which Monsanto's representative opened the con-
versation by stating that Monsanto had received many complaints with
reference to Spray-Rite's pricing policy. Monsanto urged that the refer-
ence may have been to complaints by Monsanto's own employees rather
than competing distributors. But the Court found that the choice be-
tween two reasonable interpretations of the testimony was one most
properly for the jury.1 3 7
It should be noted that there was no direct evidence of complaints
from competing distributors about Spray-Rite's pricing policies during
the fifteen months prior to termination. 138 Nevertheless, the Court found
that a jury properly could have found that there were in fact such com-
plaints from evidence that they continued after 1968.139 It should also be
noted that resale prices did not in fact stabilize as a result of Monsanto's
policy. Evidently, discounting continued to characterize the industry. 140
Thus, the evidence of concerted action in Monsanto was speculative.
The only direct evidence of an agreement to maintain retail prices oc-
curred five months after Spray-Rite was terminated and involved Mon-
santo and another distributor. There was no direct evidence linking that
agreement with the termination of Spray-Rite. The strongest evidence
that Spray-Rite was terminated pursuant to such an agreement took the
form of a post-termination comment by one of Monsanto's executives
that Monsanto had received many complaints about Spray-Rite's pricing
policies. There was no evidence that the complaints referred to were
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1472-73 nn.l1-14.
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made by distributors rather than by Monsanto's employees. Moreover,
even if there had been distributor complaints, there was no direct evi-
dence of a causal link between the complaints and termination unless one
assumes the governing legal principle to be post hoc, ergo propter hoc.
The evidentiary standard established by the Court is problematic.
Its practical effect appears to be the same as that of the court of appeals'
presumptive standard, which was explicitly rejected.141 Although termi-
nation following dealer complaints-indeed, because of dealer com-
plaints-is insufficient to permit an inference of illegal agreement, it
appears that a triable issue can be generated with little more. The
Supreme Court's opinion is, in this respect, schizophrenic. It acknowl-
edges the legality-indeed, the propriety-of dealer complaints about
discounters. It assumes that a manufacturer can act on such information
and that such action does not itself give rise to an inference of an agree-
ment. Yet, it seems to conclude that such evidence, when coupled with
evidence of an agreement with unrelated distributors at a later period of
time, is sufficient to establish both an agreement for purposes of the ter-
minated dealer and a causal connection with the latter's termination.
Counsel advising clients need to appreciate that the Court's treatment of
the facts in Monsanto was inconsistent with the tenor of its rhetoric.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE
Monsanto is a significant decision.' 4 2 The Court implicitly refused
to reaffirm the per se illegality of resale price maintenance, and thus in-
141. See supra notes 121-29 and accompanying text.
142. Monsanto also must be assessed in terms of its implications for both public and private
enforcement. The decision is not that significant in terms of federal enforcement standards, because
there are few cases with sufficiently strong evidence of illegal resale price maintenance that can be
brought by the FTC. The fact that the Commission felt a need to attempt to narrow the Colgate
defense through Russell Stover is perhaps the strongest indication of this. See supra notes 111- 17 and
accompanying text. The vast majority of firms comply with the law and do not engage in practices
that could easily be attacked as resale price maintenance. It would be surprising if it were otherwise.
A firm cannot be expected to announce to its customers that it intends to violate a law which pro-
vides for treble damages and criminal sanctions. Moreover, manufacturers interested in resale price
maintenance can obtain at least some of the benefits of the practice by employing nonprice restraints.
Given the rule of reason analysis accorded nonprice vertical restraints under the Supreme Court's
decision in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977), firms typically utilize
alternative modes of minimizing the free-rider problem. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying
text. Thus, the absence of large numbers of resale price maintenance enforcement actions does not
necessarily mean that the law is not being enforced. Rather, it probably indicates that manufactur-
ers are cognizant of the boundaries of permissible behavior and are acting accordingly.
A different set of circumstances characterizes private litigation, however, and in this arena the
significance of Monsanto might well be great. Resale price maintenance claims typically accompany
dealer termination litigation. Such suits are the traditional fare of private enforcement because the
prospect of treble damages accompanied by attorney fees and costs are generally sufficient to interest
a terminated dealer in raising any potential resale price maintenance issue. The existence of liberal
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vited future litigation to test that issue.143 The Court also restored the
luster to the Colgate doctrine. 144 This much is clear.
Unfortunately, the Court's treatment of the contract, combination,
or conspiracy requirement is exceedingly difficult to assess. Although the
Court recognizes the ambiguity of its past decisions and at least attempts
to define the outer boundaries of permissible behavior,1 45 it fails to do so
in any coherent fashion. Termination following complaints from dealers
is not enough to qualify as Dr. Miles-type conduct. 146 There must be
evidence both "that the distributor communicated its acquiescence or
agreement, and that this was sought by the manufacturer." 147 Although
the opinion noted that threatened termination and dealer newsletters
were subject to differing interpretations, nevertheless they could qualify
as the "something more" 148 needed to satisfy the concerted action re-
quirement. Such a standard provides little notice or guidance to busi-
nesses, their counsel, or the courts.
standards that permit a plaintiff to present a colorable jury issue will probably promote additional
litigation.
143. "[Uinder present law [price-fixing agreements] are subject to per se treatment and treble
damages." Monsanto, 104 S. Ct. at 1470 (emphasis added). See supra notes 103-08 and accompany-
ing text.
The Supreme Court may have an opportunity to consider this very issue in Buckingham Corp.
v. Odom Corp. In an unpublished opinion, Buckingham Corp. v. Odom Corp., 703 F.2d 573 (9th
Cir. 1983) (Nos. 81-6046 & 82-5241, reversing and remanding a case from the District of Arizona),
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a memorandum from a terminated liquor
distributor that focused on pricing reasons for its termination by the supplier, combined with a letter
from a competing distributor offering to make a resale price commitment to the supplier in return for
an exclusive distributorship, was circumstantial evidence of concerted action sufficient to withstand
the supplier's motion for a directed verdict. See Buckingham Corp. v. Odom Corp., 1984-1 TRADE
CAs. (CCH) 65,918 (U.S. Apr. 2, 1984). On appeal, the Supreme Court vacated the decision and
remanded it to the court of appeals for further consideration in light of Monsanto. Buckingham
Corp. v. Odom Corp., 104 S. Ct. 1699 (1984). The Ninth Circuit's decision remained unchanged in
an unpublished order filed August 7, 1984. The supplier then petitioned for certiorari, 53 U.S.L.W.
3419 (U.S. Nov. 16, 1984) (No. 84-806), asking, inter alia, whether in a dealer termination case such
as this the rule of reason, rather than the per se rule, should be applied. See Buckingham Corp. v.
Odom Corp., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 60,021 at 65,112.
144. See supra notes 109-19 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser
Indus., Inc., 1984-2 TRADE CAS. (CCH) 66,175, at 66,631 (7th Cir. Aug. 31, 1984) ("a classic
example of the conduct permitted by. . .Colgate. . . , a decision whose continued vitality despite
much criticism is attested to by the Supreme Court's approving reference to it in Monsanto").
145. See supra notes 99-100, 116-18 & 121-41 and accompanying text; cf supra notes 17-39 and
accompanying text.
146. Monsanto, 104 S. Ct. at 1464, 1471. But as to the probative value of dealer complaints, the
Court cautioned that "[w]e do not suggest that evidence of complaints has no probative value at all,
but only that the burden remains on the antitrust plaintiff to introduce additional evidence sufficient
to support a finding of an unlawful contract, combination, or conspiracy." Id. at 1471 n.8.
147. Id. at 1471 n.9.
148. "[Sjomething more than evidence of complaints is needed." Id. at 1471 (emphasis added).
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As the Court has recognized, sellers abiding by a resale price main-
• tenance policy have a natural incentive to complain about competitors
who do not. 49 And, again as the Court recognized, manufacturers,
when confronted with information from complaining dealers, have an
opportunity and a right to police their policy by terminating offending
dealers.' 50 The Court in Monsanto requires something more in order to
prove a section one violation. What the Court did not do was to flesh out
the additional requirement. To permit weak evidence to suffice, as the
Court did in Monsanto, is implicitly to undercut the Court's explicit dis-
cussion of the propriety of manufacturer action predicated on dealer
complaints. It allows such action, if accompanied by virtually anything
else, to give rise to a triable issue of fact. Monsanto is a decision at war
with itself.
The Court's reaffirmance of Colgate and its treatment of the evi-
dence of concerted activity also demonstrates the internal inconsistency
of the Monsanto decision. On the one hand, Monsanto says that a manu-
facturer can announce its resale prices in advance and refuse to deal with
those refusing to comply. But, the Court then finds Monsanto's efforts to
negotiate with its dealers with respect to adherence to that resale price
and its threats to terminate dealers that did not comply to be evidence
sufficient to support a finding of an unlawful contract, combination, or
conspiracy. Taken at face value, the application of this evidentiary stan-
dard to the facts of Monsanto undercuts much of the Court's discussion
of Colgate.'5' As the Monsanto Court itself noted, "If an inference of [a
price-fixing] agreement may be drawn from highly ambiguous evidence,
there is a considerable danger that the doctrines enunciated in Sylvania
and Colgate will be seriously eroded."' 152
Insufficient time has elapsed for there to be many reported deci-
sions 53 applying the Monsanto Court's opinion. Nonetheless, Judge Or-
149. Id. at 1470. See supra notes 123-25 and accompanying text.
150. Id. at 1469.
151. Cf supra note 38 and accompanying text.
152. Monsanto, 104 S. Ct. at 1470.
153. Several recent reported decisions appear to have relied upon Monsanto at least in part, not
only to implement the evidentiary standard announced by the Court, but also to address issues raised
by conduct arguably permissible under the Colgate exception. See, e.g., National Indep. Theatre
Exhibitors v. Charter Financial Group, 747 F.2d 1396, 1400, 1402 (11th Cir. 1984); Kartell v. Blue
Shield of Mass., Inc., 1984-2 TRADE CAS. (CCH) 66,300, at 67,302 (1st Cir. Nov. 28, 1984);
Airweld, Inc. v. Airco, Inc., 1984-2 TRADE CAS. (CCH) 66,197, at 66,747 (9th Cir. Sept. 11, 1984);
Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., 1984-2 TRADE CAS. (CCH) 66,175, at 66,631 (7th Cir. Aug.
31, 1984); Royal Drug Co. v. Group Life & Health Ins. Co., 737 F.2d 1433, 1438 (5th Cir. 1984);
Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse Corp. v. Esprit De Corp., 1984-2 TRADE CAS. (CCH) 66,299,
at 67,294-95 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 1984); Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 1984-2
TRADE CAS. (CCH) 66,258, at 67,126 (D.D.C. Nov. 9, 1984); Computer Place, Inc. v. Hewlett-
Packard Co., 1984-2 TRADE CAS. (CCH) 66,254 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 1984), discussed supra notes
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rick's recent decision in Computer Place, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co. 154
does provide some guidance as to the possible future effect of Monsanto.
The plaintiff in Computer Place, a retailer selling principally by mail
through one retail store, brought suit after the defendant manufacturer
had determined not to provide mail order sellers with its new personal
computer models. Plaintiff also sued another customer of defendant.
In granting defendant's motion for summary judgment, the court
cited the Supreme Court's decision in Monsanto several times.155 De-
fendant, not surprisingly, made frequent mention of the "free rider"
problem in support of its decision not to supply mail order vendors with
the product.' 56 In support of its allegation of concerted action, plaintiff
asserted that defendant retail competitor had complained about mail or-
der discounting.' 57 The court, however, observed that such com-
plaints-read properly-were nothing more than legitimate objections
about mail order vendors benefiting from the support services of conven-
tional retailers.' 58 Citing Monsanto, the court noted that such com-
plaints were normal and to be anticipated; they hardly indicated
concerted action.' 9 Indeed, the court stated: "Concern about the 'free
riding' problem is a legitimate dealer complaint."1 60 The court con-
cluded that the manufacturer had demonstrated an independent reason
why it was in its own best interest to adopt a different marketing strategy
with reference to its new line of personal computers for which point-of-
sale service was deemed important to overall sales volume. Thus, the
plaintiff "failed to produce 'evidence that tends to exclude the possibility
that the manufacturer and nonterminated distributors acted
154-63 and accompanying text; Gillette Tire Jobbers v. Appliance Indus., 596 F. Supp. 1277, 1279
(E.D. La. 1984); The Jeanery, Inc. v. James Jeans, Inc., 1984-2 TRADE CAS. (CCH) 66,278, at
67,208 (D. Ore. Oct. 1, 1984); Advisory Information & Management Sys. v. Prime Computer, Inc.,
1984-2 TRADE CAS. (CCH) 1 66,237, at 67,013-14 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 20, 1984); W. Goebel Porzel-
lanfabrik v. Action Indus., Inc., 589 F. Supp. 763, 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Reborn Enters., Inc. v. Fine
Child, Inc., 590 F. Supp. 1423, 1436, 1438-39 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Moffat v. The Lane Co., 1984-2
TRADE CAS. (CCH) 66,110, at 66,208-09 (D. Mass. June 13, 1984).
154. 1984-2 TRADE CAS. (CCH) 1 66,254 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 1984).
155. Id. at 67,100-03.
156. Defendant had previously marketed its computers to engineers and scientists who were
better acquainted with the competing products and their features. When defendant decided to enter
the home computer market, it began to rely more heavily on dealer point-of-sale service to accom-
modate the relatively unsophisticated new customer base. Id. at 67,101-04.
157. Id. at 67,100-04.
158. Id. at 67,102-03.
159. Id. The complaints referred to by plaintiff were made by conventional sellers who pointed
out that their store personnel would "presell" customers by demonstrating equipment and answering
questions, only to have many of these same "customers" then purchase the equipment from mail
order vendors. Id.




A comparison between Monsanto and Computer Place illustrates the
shortcomings of the current approach to the contract, combination, or
conspiracy requirement. In both cases the manufacturer had an in-
dependent incentive to police its reselling program, i.e., elimination of the
free rider problem. In Computer Place there was good evidence of
nonterminated dealer complaints, indeed, much better evidence than in
Monsanto. What then distinguished the two cases? Obviously one in-
volved the refusal to provide a reseller with a particular product line,
while the other was a more straightforward dealer termination case. But
this distinction is not significant, because at the heart of both the refusal-
to-deal and the dealer termination cases is the allegation that the "termi-
nated" dealer priced at other than the "right price." The operative dis-
tinction appears instead to be that the court in Computer Place
concluded that the plaintiff had failed to exclude the possibility that the
manufacturer had an independent reason for taking action. Is it simply,
then, that in Computer Place the defendant's counsel focused on the "free
rider" problem as evidence of an independent rationale for conduct,
whereas in Monsanto defense counsel did not? Perhaps.
These two cases demonstrate the tension within the case law. The
Monsanto principle employed in Computer Place-that plaintiff must ex-
clude the possibility that the manufacturer has an independent reason for
taking action-severely undercuts the conventional wisdom since manu-
facturers almost always have an independent reason-such as elimina-
tion of the "free rider" problem-for implementing and policing resale
price maintenance.1 62 Under this principle, resale price maintenance
would be actionable only where such an incentive was absent, as in the
case where it is imposed by a manufacturer at the behest of a cartel.' 63
161. Id. (quoting Monsanto, 104 S. Ct. at 1471). "Viewed in a light most favorable to [plaintiff],
the evidence shows that [defendants] were concerned about mail-order sellers. The concern demon-
strated, however, was that mail-order sellers were taking advantage of and discouraging local deal-
ers. The evidence also shows that the industry considered local dealer support essential to compete
in the new personal computer market." Id. at 67,103-04.
162. See supra notes 65-73, 79-91 and accompanying text.
163. Cf supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text. A variant of this scenario is demonstrated in
another recent case, The Jeanery, Inc. v. James Jeans, Inc., 1984-2 TRADE CAS. (CCH) 1 66,278 (D.
Ore. Oct. 1, 1984), which also relied heavily upon the Court's Monsanto decision. There, in addition
to evidence of complaints to James Jeans's sale representatives from competitor retailers about plain-
tiff's discounting and evidence that plaintiff's account was terminated in response to these complaints
(which the court acknowledged "would be insufficient alone to support an inference of conspiracy
under Monsanto," id. at 67,208), there was evidence that defendant had discussed plaintiff's pricing
practices with one of plaintiff's competitors prior to plaintiff's termination and that the competitor
had threatened to stop buying from defendant unless plaintiff was terminated. The court denied
defendant's motion for summary judgment. Significantly, no discussion of the free-rider effect or any
other efficiency justification appeared in the court's opinion. But cf Burlington Coat Factory Ware-
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Thus Computer Place may be a very important decision, not for any
novel principle of law, but because it suggests a frame of reference within
which the law of resale price maintenance is less inimical to efficiency
considerations. Given this orientation, a defendant-or a respondent in
a FTC proceeding-could negate the contract, combination, or conspir-
acy requirements by demonstrating an independent interest motivating
its actions.
If the Computer Place mode of analysis is not employed, there ap-
pear to be three remaining alternatives. First, the Court might severely
limit the Colgate doctrine, as the FTC attempted to do in Russell Stover,
and thereby make the contract, combination, or conspiracy inquiry un-
necessary. Given the Eighth Circuit's rejection of the Commission's po-
sition in Russell Stovert 64 and the Supreme Court's affirmance of
Colgate's vitality in Monsanto,165 such a course seems highly unlikely.
Second, the Court might require direct proof of a contract, combination,
or conspiracy in a vertical price-fixing case. While what constitutes "di-
rect evidence" obviously is open to dispute, the requirement of an express
assent to a price maintenance policy would provide much greater cer-
tainty than presently exists. It would also reduce the number of resale
price maintenance cases to almost zero because few well-advised manu-
facturers would solicit or accept such an express agreement. But, given
the willingness to consider circumstantial evidence throughout the law, it
is unlikely that the Court would create such a requirement in this narrow
context. Third, the Court could reject the per se legal standard applied
to resale price maintenance. Such a course would vastly reduce the uni-
verse of possible cases by requiring the plaintiff to demonstrate an an-
ticompetitive impact. 166 A failure to adopt one of these alternatives will
house Corp. v. Esprit De Corp., 1984-2 TRADE CAS. (CCH) 66,299, at 67,292-93, 67,295
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 1984) (summary judgment granted in favor of defendant manufacturer in the
context of a situation in which the plaintiff discounter did not engage in "conceptual" marketing);
Moffat v. The Lane Co., 1984-2 TRADE CAS. (CCH) % 66,110, at 66,207, 66,209 (D. Mass. June 13,
1984) (summary judgment for defendant manufacturer in the context of a situation in which the
plaintiff discounter could free ride on the showroom facilities of a codefendant competitor).
164. See supra notes 112-16 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 109-11 & 117-19 and accompanying text.
166. Overstreet and Fisher suggest a fourth alternative: retaining the per se standard but with
exceptions for some objective and easily determined fact situations. Overstreet and Fisher note that
this approach might include exceptions for new entrants and firms with small market shares where
the largest firms do not employ resale price maintenance. The advantage of this approach is that it
would be consistent with current practice in the per se area, such as in tying cases where exceptions
to the per se rule have been made for new entrants and for firms with no significant market power in
the tying product. See Overstreet & Fisher, supra note 3, at 21-22. See also T. OVERSTREET, supra
note 12, at 174-75. The principal disadvantage of this approach is that these exceptions would likely
be either over-inclusive or under-inclusive (or both), thereby failing to capture some of the efficiency
benefits of a rule of reason approach.
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allow the continued bringing and litigation of cases that turn on insignifi-
cant-and often fortuitous-facts having little or nothing to do with the
antitrust issue that is supposed to be the crux of the resale price mainte-
nance controversy. 167
V. CONCLUSION
Resale price maintenance has covered considerable distance since
the Supreme Court first examined the practice in Fowle v. Park168 in
1889. Until Dr. Miles, the Court analyzed the practice under a rule of
reason. Thereafter, a rule of per se illegality took hold, although Dr.
Miles was actually decided under common law principles. Over the next
twenty-five years, while the courts struggled with the tension between the
Court's decisions in Dr. Miles and Colgate, the growth of the chain store
generated pressure on Congress for a legislative solution; this led to the
passage of the Miller-Tydings Amendment in 1937 and the McGuire Act
in 1952 which, in effect, created a rule of per se legality. Various loop-
holes soon appeared to the fair trade provisions, and judicial decisions
joined in chipping away at these laws' effectiveness. The per se rule of
legality was laid to rest with the repeal of the Miller-Tydings Amend-
ment and the McGuire Act in 1975. Today, resale price maintenance is
evaluated under a per se standard of illegality.
All the while, the Court has come to accept that, in practice, resale
price maintenance has ambiguous economic consequences, and, in some
instances, decidedly procompetitive effects. The dichotomy between
price and nonprice restraints that the Court created in GTE Sylvania,
coupled with recognition that many of the goals of resale price mainte-
nance can be achieved through nonprice restraints, has led many observ-
ers to wonder whether the Dr. Miles rule of per se illegality is still
appropriate. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp. can be viewed as
an attempt by the Court to bring the Dr. Miles rule to terms with busi-
ness realities, especially the exercise of Colgate rights.
167. The Monsanto Court noted that the principal flaw in the evidentiary standard adopted by
the court of appeals is that it undercuts the standards employed in Colgate and GTE Sylvania:
Nevertheless, it is of considerable importance that independent action by the manufac-
turer, and concerted action on nonprice restrictions, be distinguished from price-fixing
agreements, since under present law the latter are subject to per se treatment and treble
damages. On a claim of concerted price-fixing, the antitrust plaintiff must present evidence
sufficient to carry its burden of proving that there was such an agreement. If an inference
of such an agreement may be drawn from highly ambiguous evidence, there is a considera-
ble danger that the doctrines enunciated in Sylvania and Colgate will be seriously eroded.
The flaw in the evidentiary standard adopted by the Court of Appeals in this case is
that it disregards this danger.
Monsanto, 104 S. Ct. at 1470. See also id. at 1468 n.6.
168. 131 U.S. 88 (1889), discussed supra note 12.
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Monsanto is the product of a doctrine at war with itself.169
Although Dr. Miles and Colgate can coexist peacefully in the theoretical
realm, the pressures of business conducted in a competitive marketplace
have turned that relationship into something less than harmonious. The
Court in Monsanto was lulled by the security of judicial precedent but
needled by the demands of economic reality. The Court refused to
choose between the two, deferring that task to some future time. In so
doing, it produced a decision of limited longevity, but considerable util-
ity. Monsanto is noteworthy not so much for what it does today but for
what it signals on the horizon for tomorrow.
169. Doctrinal inconsistencies in other areas of antitrust law have suggested to other commenta-
tors the aptness of the metaphor of civil warfare. See, e.g., R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A
POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 7 (1978); F. ROWE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBIN-
SON-PATMAN ACT xi (1962 & Supp. 1964). The phrase is equally descriptive of the past and present
state of resale price maintenance.
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